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Power management units (PMU) have come into the spotlight with energy efficiency
becoming a first order constraint in modern digital computing systems. Dynamic power
management solutions are spread across multiple layers of the hardware and software
design spectrum, often requiring synergistic operation of power control knobs. To cater
to the exponential rise in power events, and to meet the demands of tight power and
energy budgets, power management solutions are evolving into feature rich, complex and
intelligent designs. The evolution of this industry has created a dynamic, volatile, and
competitive landscape, resulting in several third-party solutions entering the niche market,
raising concerns of trust and security assurance.
This research embarks on cross-layer analysis to identify, classify, detect and prevent
emerging threats in power management solutions. To uncover a broad spectrum of pos-
sible security violations, two incarnations of security problems stemming from the ram-
pant use of untrustworthy third-party components are explored. One targeting special-
ized hardware PMU, and the other, complex software power management modules in the
data-center hypervisor. Security vulnerability in these complex sub-systems arise either
iv
from security oblivious design artifacts, or from intentional insertion of trojans. Compre-
hending the challenges of security assurance by attack realization, this research proposes
novel non-invasive detection and defense mechanisms against compromised power man-
agement units.
Today, power management is synonymous with digital computing. Given the prolif-
eration of digital devices in all walks of life, be it in battery operated mobile devices or,
high-performance data-centers, this research potentially has far reaching impacts on our
society. Altogether, this work pioneers research in a critical, yet vastly unexplored research
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Design of computing systems — from pocket-sized smart phones to massive cloud
based data-centers — have one common daunting challenge : minimizing the power con-
sumption. In this effort, power management sector is undergoing a rapid and profound
transformation to promote clean and energy proportional computing. At the hardware
end of system design, there is proliferation of specialized, feature rich and complex power
management hardware components. Similarly, in the software design layer complex power
management suites are growing rapidly. Concurrent to this development, there has been
an upsurge in the integration of third-party components to counter the pressures of shorter
time-to-market. These trends collectively raise serious concerns about trust and security
of power management solutions.
In recent times, problems such as overheating, performance degradation and poor
battery life, have dogged the mobile devices market, including the infamous recall of Sam-
sung Note 7. Power outage in the data-center of a major airline left innumerable passen-
gers stranded, with thousands of canceled flights costing over 100 million dollars. This
research examines whether such events of unintentional reliability failure, can be repli-
cated using targeted attacks by exploiting the security loopholes in the complex power
management infrastructure of a computing system.
At its core, this research answers an imminent research question: How can system de-
signers ensure secure and reliable operation of third-party power management units? Specifically,
vi
this work investigates possible attack vectors, and novel non-invasive detection and de-
fense mechanisms to safeguard system against malicious power attacks. By a joint explo-
ration of the threat model and techniques to seamlessly detect and protect against power
attacks, this project can have a lasting impact, by enabling the design of secure and cost-
effective next generation hardware platforms.
vii
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Design of modern information and communication technology (ICT) systems—from
miniature internet of thing (IoT) devices to massive cloud based data centers—have one
common, daunting challenge : minimizing the power consumption. Recent studies have
shown that ICT systems currently consume nearly 10% (∼ 1500TWh) of the world’s elec-
trical energy, and its share is expected to rise 21% by the year 2030 (Figure 1.1) [1]. A major
percentage (81%) of this energy consumption is dominated by high performance digital
computing systems (data-centers) and fixed access networks due to an unprecedented rise
in data/content generation and consumption. Accordingly, the CO2 emissions related to
digital systems will contribute to approximately 4% of global emissions in four years. Re-
alizing the environmental and social impact, the digital computing sector has triggered a
rapid and profound transformation to promote clean and energy efficient computing.
1.1 Trends in Power Management
The power management in modern computing systems encompasses several layers
of the design spectrum including the application, operating system (OS), hypervisor, low-
level software such as firmware and device drivers, hardware architecture, circuit and
device layers (Figure 1.2a). Figure 1.2b shows the landscape of power management and the
(a)
Fig. 1.1: Components of ICT and its contribution to the global electricity (2030).
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increasingly complex interactions between the hardware and software power management
features. The vehement emphasis on energy efficiency has put ICT power management
front and center, and fueled extensive technological innovations at all abstraction levels of
the ICT design, rendering a very complex power management architecture [2].
At one end of the design spectrum, third-party computing power management soft-
ware suites have swelled to a net size of $314 million, with a growth of 35.48% during
the years 2012-2016 [3]. These software suites promise to deliver $18.6 billion/year in cost
reduction [4], complementing the rapid evolution of intelligent and complex power man-
agement algorithms in OS kernels, and device drivers.
At the other end, extensive proliferation of specialized hardware components for chip
level power management—power management units (PMU)—are dominating more than
50% of the analog integrated circuit (IC) market today [5]. PMUs offer a host of services
ranging from system start-up and shut-down to dynamic control of power rails, voltage
scaling and management of power states. Traditional simple PMUs for low cost power
conversion are evolving into feature rich, hardware controlled and intelligent power man-
agement IPs (PMIPs) to increase energy efficiency and provide flexible power management
in high-end multi-processor system on chips (MPSoC) [6]. This trend in hardware PMUs
is part of a broader trend of upsurge in the integration of third-party intellectual property
(3PIP) components within a single hardware platform, so as to achieve a rapid time to
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1.2: Landscape and scope of power management features.
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market [7, 8].
1.2 Problem : Security Vulnerabilities in Power Management
The influx of copious technological innovations for efficient power and thermal man-
agement, has brought forth a new potent attack surface—the complex power management
architecture. The intricate interplay of the control signals across the design layers, com-
bined with the phenomenal growth and integration of niche third-party components poses
intriguing questions regarding the trustworthiness of the upcoming power management
architecture. This research tackles a critical, yet vastly unexplored research question: How
can we assure reliable and trustworthy computing in the presence of untrustworthy
third-party components in the power management architecture?
A malicious trojan embedded in the third-party power management unit can cause
sporadic errors, reliability issues, or even catastrophic failures. These attacks can result in
data corruption, denial of service, or degradation of the system performance and energy
efficiency. For example, a malicious increase in the supply voltage can cause a surge in
the peak power and chip temperature, leading to thermal throttling, functional errors and
even a systematic chip failure. This research embarks on a cross-layer and comprehensive
analysis to identify, classify, detect and prevent emerging threats from the power manage-
ment systems. With the evolution of power management systems, both in software and
hardware, a study of their influence on system functionality, performance and energy ef-
ficiency is critical to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of future computing
systems. The project can spawn a radical shift from the current practices, where the power
management system is assumed to be trustworthy, and thus free of malicious intent.
1.3 Impact of Security Vulnerabilities in Power Management
Numerous events in the recent past highlight the danger emanating from vulnerabil-
ities in power management systems. In August 2016, a power outage in the data center
of Delta airlines left innumerable passengers stranded, with thousands of canceled flights,
4
costing over a 100 million dollars [9]. Similarly, an outage in the Verizon data-center re-
sulted in JetBlue flight delays, along with shutdown of the airline’s website and booking
systems [10]. A failure of the Oregon government services data-center delayed unemploy-
ment payments and loss of email access to government employees [11].
In the last few years, a plethora of problems such as overheating, performance degra-
dation and poor battery life, have dogged the mobile devices market, including the recall
of Samsung Note 7 [12]. In 2012, complaints about the Apple iPad’s wireless reliability
were traced back to a power-saving feature that ran amok and starved the Wi-Fi chip of
the required power [13]. The automobile industry, with its emerging massive digital sys-
tem integration, is also at the cusp of this problem. For instance, Chrysler had to recall
more than 300, 000 vehicles due to a faulty integrated power module [14]. Similarly, Toyota
announced a safety recall of 807, 000 Prius cars due to a malfunction in the power man-
agement electronics control unit that prevented the vehicle from entering fail-safe driving
mode as intended [15]. In the safety critical military Reaper drone, mysterious electrical
failures have caused a surge in major drone crashes [16].
Deliberate attacks on the complex power management infrastructure can damage ICT
systems, often resulting in severe loss of productivity, economy and reputation. Loss of
access to services in the health-care, finance and transportation sectors can prove catas-
trophic. Irrespective of whether these events are results of unintentional reliability failures
or targeted attacks, they have a profound significance on trustworthy computing in the
modern world. A key research question then is how can we identify threats and defense mecha-
nisms to protect this emerging attack surface on our power management systems?
1.4 Contributions of this Research
This systematic investigation lays a solid foundation to security assessment in power
management by uncovering a new class of security vulnerabilities and the imminent threat
they pose to the emerging computing paradigm. In this pursuit, this research explores
cross-layer methodologies for the design of secure power management platforms and tech-
5
niques. Figure 1.3 summarizes the collective threat model investigated in this work. At one
end of the design spectrum, this work uncovers the impact of hardware trojan embedded
in the power management unit of a MPSoC. At the other end, this work identifies and an-
alyzes the potency of malicious software power management module in the virtualization
suite of the data-center. Although seemingly disjoint, at their core, these two security prob-
lems stem from the rampant use of untrustworthy third-party components in the complex
power management sub-system.
Publications in direct relation to this dissertation are listed below:
• Securing Data Center Against Power Attacks, JS, Rajesh, Rajamanikkam, Chidham-
baranathan, Chakraborty, Koushik, Roy, Sanghamitra. Journal of Hardware and Sys-
tems Security. (2019)
• Catching the Flu: Emerging Threats from a Third Party Power Management Unit,
JS, Rajesh, Chidhambaranathan Rajamanikkam, Koushik Chakraborty, and Sang-
hamitra Roy. Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Design Automation Conference (DAC),
(2016).
• Runtime Detection of a Bandwidth Denial Attack from a Rogue Network-on-Chip,
Fig. 1.3: Research outline: cross-layer security issues stemming from third-party the power
management components.
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JS, Rajesh, Dean Michael Ancajas, Koushik Chakraborty, and Sanghamitra Roy, Pro-
ceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Networks-on-Chip (NOCS), (2015).
This research spawns a radical shift from the current practices, where the power man-
agement features are assumed to be from a trusted source, and thus free of malicious intent.
This research can prove instrumental in reshaping the design practices of future digital
computing systems. The specific contributions are as follows:
• Uncovers two covert threats to the MPSoC, stemming from a hardware trojan embed-
ded in an untrustworthy third-party hardware power management unit. Performs
detailed analysis on the impact of attacks on performance and energy efficiency of
the computing system.
• Proposes a novel intellectual property risk assessment module (IPRAM) that can be im-
plemented in-house by an MPSoC integrator to evaluate power management request-
response combinations and detect malicious activities in the PMU.
• Designs and evaluates two attack specific non-invasive security solutions, that are
bundled into the IPRAM to aid runtime monitoring of power management decisions.
These solutions effectively detect the targeted malicious activity, while incurring low
design overheads (less than 1%) in area and power.
• Investigates an incarnation of software-centric threat in the power management sub-
system of a high performance data-center. The devised threat exploits security loop-
holes to carry out a broad range of potent power and energy attacks compromising
the system behavior.
• Introduces a secure sub-system architecture by employing a machine learning algo-
rithm to monitor and learn acceptable data-center power characteristics under dy-
namic workloads. The proposed architecture safeguards the data-center by identi-
fying malicious power consumption behavior. Central to the secure architecture are
concepts of isolation and redundancy.
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• Evaluates the efficacy of the proposed learning framework and tunes the solution to
achieve a high accuracy in distinguishing between legitimate and anomalous power
consumption behavior for the examined data-center characteristics.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
The dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 equips the reader with a thorough review of contemporary research on
the growing complexities of the power management sub-system, security vulnera-
bilities in third-party components, cloud security and power management verifica-
tion to highlight the need for research on exposing the security vulnerabilities in power
management.
• Chapter 3 outlines the generic threat model to realize compromised third party soft-
ware and hardware components, and discusses the relevance of such vulnerabilities
in modern computing ecosystem.
• Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of two covert security threats, P-Virus and
Drowsy stemming from a hardware trojan embedded in a malicious third-party PMU.
Consequently, the chapter presents the design specifics of the proposed non-invasive
IP risk assessment module to monitor the trust and security of deployed PMU by
matching response to requests at critical interfaces.
• Chapter 5 uncovers a potent threat from a compromised software power manage-
ment module in the hypervisor to motivate the need to safeguard data-centers from
power attacks. Next, it details the proposed machine learning based secure archi-
tecture to detect anomalous power consumption activity and protect against catas-
trophic power outages.
• Chapter 6 summarizes the contribution of this research, and paves the way for fu-
ture research in this domain by highlighting the key challenges for security in power
management solutions.
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1.6 Breadth of Doctoral Work
This section presents the synopsis of research publications in the field of security and
reliability of system-on-chip components published during the course of this doctoral re-
search.
• Runtime detection of a bandwidth denial attack from a rogue network-on-chip [17,18] - This
research investigates the threat of a hardware trojan in a third-party network-on-chip
(NoC). A malicious trojan in the NoC can disrupt the availability of on-chip com-
munication resources, thereby creating a huge performance bottleneck. The work
proposes a runtime latency auditor that enables the multi-processor system-on-chip
(MPSOC) integrator to monitor the trustworthiness of the deployed NoC throughout
the chip lifetime.
• Tackling voltage emergencies in NoC through timing error resilience [19] - This research
tackles the reliability concern due to voltage emergencies in forthcoming NoC de-
signs. The work proposes a droop resilient NoC architecture with two techniques to
mitigate and recover from voltage emergency induced timing errors. The proposed
techniques use concepts of frequency down-scaling and pipeline error recovery to
reclaim corrupt flits in the router, and maintain a reliable and energy efficient opera-
tion.
• Tackling voltage noise in the NoC power supply through flow-control and routing algorithms
[20, 21] - This research proposes a collection of novel flow-control protocols and an
adaptive routing algorithm to mitigate the power supply noise in NoC and preserve
power supply integrity.
• BoostNoC: Power efficient network-on-chip architecture for near threshold computing [22] -
This research investigates a promising and emerging design approach for energy ef-
ficient systems—near threshold computing (NTC). The work demonstrates that NoC
can prove to be a performance bottleneck in many-core NTC systems. To reclaim the
performance lost due to sub-optimal design in the NTC regime, the work proposes
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and evaluates BoostNoC—a power efficient, multi-layered NoC architecture. Boost-
NoC exploits the temporal and spatial variation of on-chip communication demand
in a MPSoC under dynamic workloads, and seamlessly shifts between two layers
optimized for contrasting design parameters: performance and power-efficient data
transmission.
• Catching the flu: Emerging threats from a third-party power management unit [23] - This
work investigates the security vulnerabilities stemming from complex power man-
agement hardware sub-systems. The research demonstrates two covert attacks de-
signed using a hardware trojan embedded in the power management unit. To detect
malicious power management behavior and monitor trustworthiness the work pro-
poses a non-invasive IP risk assessment module.
• Securing data-center against power attacks [24] - This work uncovers a potent threat
emerging from vulnerabilities in the power management module of a data-center hy-
pervisor. The compromised power management module inflicts a power attack and
increases the data-center power consumption significantly. The work investigates a
secure learning framework based on a support vector machine learning algorithm to
detect anomalous power consumption behavior in the data-center.
• Understanding Security Threats in Emerging Neuromorphic Computing - This yet to be
published research, investigated the security loopholes in a neuromorphic system
design environment. The work examined multiple exploitable attack vectors stem-
ming from hardware trojan insertion, as well as, from inherent device, circuit and
implementation specific vulnerabilities. The dissection of these vulnerabilities will
help in systematic development of collective security primitives and design-for-trust




Demand for energy efficiency, intelligent battery management, energy harvesting and
wireless charging features continue to re-sculpt ICT industry’s power management land-
scape. System evaluation metrics are evolving from pure performance based measures
(operating frequency, throughput, etc.,) to energy centric parameters (performance per
watt, energy delay product, etc.,) to reflect the growing demand for energy proportional
computing. Consequently, an alarming trend seen in the rapidly evolving power man-
agement solution space is the proliferation of digital complexity for reliable and efficient
power delivery. Designers of ICT systems such as smartphones, notebooks, workstations
and, even the cloud infrastructure are becoming increasingly reliant on third-party ven-
dors to fulfill the complex and niche power requirements [25]. This Chapter introduces
the advances in power management solutions across all design layers, and emphasizes the
lack of research in security and trust assurance of power management solutions.
Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 together, delineate the landscape of modern power man-
agement sub-systems to trace the progression of the domain. Section 2.3 summarizes pre-
vious literature on power management security to assess the state-of-the art, and clarify
the significance of our research. Finally, Section 2.4 presents other security related research
most relevant to this project to justify the choice of research topic.
2.1 Landscape of Power Management Hardware
Modern hardware PMUs include a broad portfolio of digitally enabled, configurable
and fully programmable complex power controllers. Table 2.1 presents the taxonomy of
evolving hardware PMU.
Off-chip hardware PMUs integrate power converters required to deliver power to
processors, interfaces, memory, and various sensors, low drop-out linear regulators (LDO)
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for peripheral devices, battery charging, and control intelligence [26–28]. Features such
as active and dynamic voltage positioning based on dynamic load are becoming increas-
ingly important for both thermal management, as well as, longer battery life. Technology
standards such as Intel’s mobile voltage positioning (IMVP) define strict specifications re-
garding input pins, control signals, output signals, softstart, restart and voltage-slew rate
control. Many modern PMUs have additional capabilities that include system clock gen-
eration, analog to digital conversion and digital input/outputs.
Advanced hand-held low power systems and MPSoCs require controlled and chore-
ographed sequencing of various power domains as on-chip IP blocks have critical timing
dependencies. Additionally, differences in battery chemistry necessitate unique charging
techniques, algorithms and voltages to optimize battery performance, capacity, reliability,
safety, thermal behavior and longevity [29–31]. PMU targeted for smartphones and tablets
are highly programmable and reconfigurable units equipped with essential real-time bat-
tery monitors to protect against harmful charging and discharging conditions [31].
Finally, to address the growing demand for power fidelity and integrity in shrinking
MPSoCs, novel on-chip power management IPs are on the rise [6, 32, 33]. These IPs allow
for fine grain power management with features supporting hundreds of power domains,
Hardware PMU Description and Sample Systems
Programmable PMUs
Functionality includes sequencing voltage rails, pro-
grammable regulators, intelligent battery charging, among
others. Popular PMUs have adopted Intel’s smart regula-
tion technique called Intel mobile voltage positioning (IMVP)
specifications for their design [26–28].
Feature rich PMUs for
portable devices
Functionality includes efficient battery management, while
simultaneously operating a host of sensors, camera, radio and
wireless connectivity, all powered from a single lightweight
battery. [29–31].
On-chip fine grain PMU
New generation PMU designed as an on-chip IP to support
faster and simultaneous power states transitions of multiple
circuits and voltage islands. Sonics ICE-Grain power archi-
tecture is the industry’s first such solution [6, 32,33].
Table 2.1: Classification of hardware PMUs employed by modern MPSoCs.
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power gating of voltage islands and operation at near threshold voltage. These fine grain
IPs cater to very fast switching activity while tackling issues such as jitter, clock skews,
electromigration, coupling noise and power distribution droops.
2.2 Landscape of Power Management Software
While hardware design dictates the upper bounds on system performance and energy
efficiency, the software stack is essential to leverage the features to deliver an optimal so-
lution. Power management implementation in the software can be at the firmware, virtual
machine (VM), OS, and application layer based on access to relevant data, response time
and control granularity of resources. Rather than trying to survey this huge design space,
Table 2.2 examines a few representative examples to illustrate the diversity of existing so-
lutions, with increasing coarseness of control granularity.
Many open source frameworks for power monitoring and control such as global ex-
tensible open power manager (GEOPM), PowerAPI and advanced configuration and power
interface (ACPI) provide high-level power management interfaces for accessing power
knobs [34–36]. ACPI platform exposes platform-independent interfaces for hardware con-
figuration, power monitoring and control, to the OS policies. ACPI specifications define
multiple power states, known as global states, device states, processor states and perfor-
mance states that can be leveraged by the OS to implement power policies.
Software layer Description and Sample Techniques
Firmware/device drivers
Responsible for exposing hardware performance counters,
software-defined events to upper layers of software stack.
Software library with APIs to access power control knobs
[34–36].
Operating system and hy-
pervisor
Policies and algorithms that leverage firmware capability for
dynamic control of power consumption and system resource
utilization [37–39]
Application
Power-aware optimization of applications, maximizing per-
formance within set power bounds by adaptive and dynamic
reconfiguration [40,41].
Table 2.2: Classification of software power management solutions.
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Hypervisors and OS take specific actions to optimize device power consumption by
making dynamic and runtime decisions to selectively power down logic blocks and pe-
ripherals based on resource utilization. Several algorithms have been proposed previously
to set static and dynamic bounds on application power consumption for energy efficient
operation. Based on the system under consideration, two broad principles are employed
for energy efficient dynamic control of resource utilization, (a) optimize energy consumed
by resources under active workload, and (b) minimize power consumption under no/low
load [37–39].
Static power analysis tools, compilers, programming models and power aware op-
timization techniques have been developed to minimize power consumption in applica-
tions. Compilers optimize instruction scheduling, register assignments, cache access and
loop transformations, among other application dependent parameters to gain energy sav-
ings. Application power analysis tools and programming models are being developed
to deliver energy transparency to the designer, along with established low power coding
standards. Additionally, learning algorithms are being adopted to perform usage pattern
based power optimization [40, 41].
In a nutshell, abundant number of independent solutions have been proposed and
evaluated at various abstraction levels employing the same knobs for power control. In
this convoluted software ecosystem, mismanagement and manipulations of power man-
agement solutions are likely to cause unpredictable, and potentially catastrophic behavior
of a system.
2.3 Power Management Security
Security analysis of power management sub-systems in computing systems is largely
unexplored, and is principally limited to traditional test and verification techniques. Exist-
ing literature reveals research on power management robustness analysis [42, 43], power
grid verification [44, 45], and thermal monitoring [46, 47], to ensure the functionality and
reliability of the chip. Although these solutions play an important role in rooting out de-
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sign problems, they cannot be easily adopted for runtime security assurance of power
management solutions in the MPSoC post-deployment.
• Bembaron et al. explore power aware simulation emphasizing on the use of unified
power format (UPF) standard for verification of dynamic power management tech-
niques in low power systems [43]. The research focuses on functional verification
of power control hierarchy, power sequence protocols, memory retention behavior
and power control signal corruption using static checks and power aware simula-
tion. Dormant trojans inserted in a compromised design space can side-step such
pre-fabrication functional tests.
• Kouroussis et al. propose a static technique for power grid verification to ensure that
the voltage on the power grid does not drop below a critical threshold. They evaluate
the use of pattern independent linear programs to verify a set of designer supplied
current constraints [44]. A compromised PMU with control over supply voltage can
thwart such pre-deployment verification techniques.
• Francisco et al. investigate the use of an infrared measurement setup in combination
with genetic algorithm for non-invasive runtime analysis of power and thermal char-
acteristics of integrated chips [46]. Subsequently, they followed up by characterizing
and classifying popular workloads used for architectural design exploration from a
thermal standpoint. This work provides valuable insights into the dynamic thermal
and power characteristics of real hardware at runtime [47]. However, a compromised
PMU can manipulate the characterization process.
• Najeeb et al. are among the first to introduce the concept of power and thermal
virus [48], where a set of input vectors are found to inflict maximum dynamic power
dissipation in the system under test. Several following works use this concept con-
structively in peak power estimation, integration testing, thermal testing and prod-
uct benchmarking [49, 50].
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Security analysis and exploits specifically related to the power consumption in low
power ICT systems is limited to power signature based side channel analysis and ther-
mal sensor monitoring [51–54]. These works illustrate innovative attack vectors to exploit
power signature based security loopholes in low power embedded systems. A common
theme in all these works is that the hardware power management infrastructure is consid-
ered to be trustworthy.
• Messerges et al. examine the use of simple and differential power analysis to steal
sensitive information from smart-cards. They implement power analysis attacks on
the data encryption standard (DES) algorithm and demonstrate a multiple-bit attack
to extract the DES encryption key in a very short amount of time. Ambrose et al.
study power analysis attacks in processor architecture and propose security mech-
anisms to scramble the power waveform with random instructions and register ac-
cesses to mask the power signatures [53].
• Guri et al. demonstrate a technique to bridge the air-gap between two compromised
systems in close proximity and render bi-directional communication. Their research
reveals that using heat emissions and built-in thermal sensors a covert communica-
tion channel can be created to communicate very small amount of data (1-8 bits per
hour). Although this attack is limited to systems in close proximity, and allow very
slow communication between the compromised systems, they demonstrate innova-
tive and covert attack vectors to exploit security vulnerabilities [52].
• Hutter et al. present a set of temperature related side-channel attacks on a low power
micro-controller. Characterizing the relationship between heat dissipation and cir-
cuit activity, the research demonstrates data leakage relative to the hamming weight.
They inflict a fault attack on the micro-controller by operating the device beyond the
specified temperature, and present a technique to exploit the physical property of
data remanence attack by applying extensive heat to burn in constant data stored in
the microcontroller [54].
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Similarly, cloud infrastructure security is a hotbed of research activity. The synthesis
of research on power management and data-center security gives rise to alarming new
threats posing formidable challenges.
• In high performance data-centers, Wu et al. demonstrates energy attacks targeted
solely at abusing server power consumption [55]. The research first profiles the
power consumption of victim server, and then leverages knowledge of the client
service usage pattern to generate specific requests to increase power consumption
by inflicting cache misses. The energy attack increases server power consumption
significantly with small increase in service response latency keeping the attack hid-
den.
• Palmieri et al. unveil a series of denial of service (DoS) attacks that increase the power
consumption by exploiting the resources in the data-center [56]. This work details a
new perspective to DoS attacks exploiting network bandwidth exhaustion, process-
ing power exhaustion and disk solicitation purely to increase the energy demand of
the victim machine.
• Xu et al. investigate power attacks to cause undesired power outages [57]. The re-
search illustrates the generation of power spikes by adjusting workloads, exploiting
virtual machine migration and developing specific service usage patterns to trip the
electrical circuit breakers in data-center infrastructure. Consequently, the publication
briefly discusses a few existing mechanisms that can be adopted to mitigate power
attacks.
• Gao et al. explore thermal attacks to increase the server temperatures and degrade
performance and reliability of the systems [58]. Their research employs thermal-
intensive workloads to create local hotspots in the data-center hosts to inflict cooling
failures.
This research spawns a shift from these works by considering a compromised power
management unit, further complicating the existing problem. The central focus of this
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research is to uncover the implications of untrustworthy power management in modern computing
systems—an uncharted territory.
2.4 Relevant Hardware Security Research
Security assurance of on-chip hardware components is an obstacle of growing mag-
nitude and importance. The pervasive use of third-party components and IPs has created
opportunities for unforeseen security vulnerabilities. Contemporary works have revealed
that hardware trojans can be embedded in the third party components used in MPSoCs
such as processor cores, on-chip communication platforms and memory modules [59, 60].
Recent works in hardware security include protection against compromised foundries
by detecting malicious circuit modifications including hardware trojan detection (e.g., [7,
61–63], among others), techniques to enable secure execution at the microprocessor (e.g.,
[64–66]), securing off-chip memory access ( [67, 68], among others), and protect against
counterfeiting through physically unclonable functions (PUF) (e.g., [69,70], among others).
Hu et al. investigate the use of multi-modal thermal and power characterization tech-
niques to detect hardware trojan inserted during the compromised fabrication process [61].
The proposed technique entails the creation of thermal maps using infrared imaging for
real chips to extract the spatial power consumption. However, to detect a Trojan, the tech-
nique assumes the presence of a golden model without the Trojan for comparison, detec-
tion and localization. The lack of golden model for third-party components, and digression
in attack manifestation of a trojan in PMU makes power, thermal and other side-channel
characterization techniques ineffective.
Ravi et al. argue that in practice, the use of functional security measures alone is far
from ideal for security assurance of embedded systems. They echo the concern presented
in this work that design complexity and implementation weakness can result in unforeseen
security flaws [65]. Their publication surveys a host of attacks, various counter measures
for tamper-resistant design assurance. Based on their survey they infer that design of
efficient security assurance techniques require a clear understanding of the attacks, as well
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as, trade-offs associated with security assurance.
Sifting through existing literature revealed that no previous work investigates threats
and attack manifestations from a compromised power management hardware. The unique
role of the PMU, combined with the existence of a singular instance in an MPSoC renders
a majority of existing security assurance solutions ineffective. Chen et al. propose task
duplication to verify the validity of one execution [71]. While their work is an important
step forward, it is unable to protect against a malicious PMU, as MPSoCs contain a single
instance of PMU rendering their comparison based strategy ineffective.
Besides, contemporary research on providing application security in an unsecured OS
setting are comparable, albeit at a higher abstraction level [72–81]). Although a few of these
works can be adapted to limit the exposed vulnerabilities, they cannot detect or prevent
against malicious modifications in the PMU hardware.
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CHAPTER 3
SOURCE OF SECURITY THREAT
Globalization, rapidly changing consumer demands, shrinking product life cycles and
fierce competition has changed the dynamics and organization of the computing sector’s
supply chain. Modern ICT systems have a globally distributed supply chain with both,
hardware and software constituting of numerous components that are sourced from a
multitude of third-party vendors. In this globalized and collaborative innovation design
model, trust and security are fundamental for the seamless integration and interaction be-
tween specialized hardware components and extensive software suites of the ICT system.
Yet, third-party vendors are averse to expose their internal design to the system integra-
tor to protect their competitive advantage in their niche domains, thereby creating a stiff
barrier to many existing trust assurance techniques. As a result, the notion of trust in ICT
systems has become a moving target.
This chapter discusses two orthogonal sources of security vulnerabilities that can ex-
pose the power management infrastructure to a potentially catastrophic attack. Section 3.1
presents the relevance and typical life-cycle of malicious trojans embedded in the hardware
or software modules of the ICT system. Section 3.2 dissects the eventuality of unsuspect-
ing design choices leading to uncharted security flaws. Section 3.3, finally summarizes the
trusted and compromised components in threat models considered for this research across
two projects discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
3.1 Malicious Trojans
In digital computing, trojan is an umbrella term used for covert malware that can be
concealed within the legitimate digital design. Simply put, it is a delivery mechanism
that an attacker can use to gain access to the system and carry out a myriad of attacks
compromising the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the underlying ICT system.
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Researchers, academicians and industry experts have explored an overabundance of
trojan related security vulnerabilities, metrics and remedies in the software domain [82,83].
Contemporary research clearly demonstrate the presence of trojans in operating system
(OS) kernels [84], device driver customization [85], software libraries [86], virtualization
techniques [87], and applications [88]. Similarly, over the past decade, a plethora of previ-
ous works have established that an adversary can introduce a malicious circuits (hardware
trojans) during the design, fabrication and manufacturing of application specific integrated
circuits (ASIC) [89–91]. In line with previous studies on trojans, without loss of general-
ity, the following section outlines the sequence of phases to realize a potent trojan in the
third-party power management sub-system.
3.1.1 Life Cycle of a Trojan
A typical trojan life-cycle comprises of three distinct phases of activities detailed be-
low.
• Trojan Insertion: Complex designs, lack of sufficient budget, time and technology
for rigorous verification, and inadequate supervision of engineers has resulted in an
untrustworthy ICT supply chain. A few rogue engineers can insert malicious circuits
or backdoors during the design and verification of a system and its applications [92].
Trojans are designed to have low design and activity footprints, so as to camouflage
their presence during pre-deployment verification and validation tests. There ex-
ist cases of disgruntled employees involved in unprofessional practices, as well as,
cases of corporate sabotage resulting in exploitable backdoors [93]. Recently, a key
player in the processor sector was accused of using its position to ward-off competi-
tion by sabotaging its compiler to use sub-optimal code paths in their competitor’s
hardware [94]. Additionally, internal attacks are one of the biggest concerns in the
IT industry [95]. In software, even if the initial release is malware-free, it can subse-
quently be tampered by exploiting flaws in the patch management process [96]. The
patch payload can contain a trojan along with the legitimate code addressing a real
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issue. Since, many updates are now processed online, the source request for patch
updates can be redirected to a mirror web address (hijack/spoof attack). Similar
models of trojan insertion can be adopted to embed malicious trojans in the power
management sub-system.
• Trojan Activation: The attacker can employ a variety of subtle activation mecha-
nisms that can either be triggered by the internal or the external environment by
creating a rare-event trigger [89–91]. Externally activated trojan triggers rely on
the interaction with the outside world and hence require a medium to communi-
cate or access data to/from an external environment. Use of antenna, sensors, in-
put/output peripherals, etc. are the common modes of external activation. Similarly,
a variety of internal triggers can also be envisaged (e.g., logic/condition based, time
based, temperature/voltage based, supply noise based and internal counter based
triggers). Another class of trojan trigger involves the coalition of software-hardware,
where an application running on the hardware can send a sequence of cryptic mes-
sages/requests to activate a dormant trojan in the hardware [97]. Since, third-party
components allow limited opportunity for introspection, a smart designer can care-
fully create an activation module that can elude existing trojan detection techniques.
Specifically, in software, existing bugs in the legacy code can also be used to trigger
the malware by creating a rare event [98].
• Trojan Operation: Once activated, the trojan can inflict a plethora of attacks on both,
hardware components and client applications, adversely affecting the overall system
behavior. The type, flavor and potency of an attack on the power management mod-
ule is only limited by the attackers imagination due to its overreaching influence
on the entire system. Broadly, malicious behavior in the power management can
lead to data corruption, denial of service, degradation of system performance and
energy efficiency, and even result in permanent chip failures due to burnout. Even
an uncomplicated attack such as an undesired increase in the supply voltage can
cause a surge in the peak power and chip temperature, leading to thermal throttling,
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functional errors and systematic chip failure. The specific attacks envisaged in this
research, along with their implementation details and impact on system behavior are
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
3.2 Security Oblivious Design Artifacts
Burgeoning power management software stack complexity, compounded with multi-
ple specialized hardware-software interfaces, and lack of proper verification methodolo-
gies, will together create a security eventuality, even in an absence of malicious intent.
Recent discovery of security flaws, meltdown and spectre, in the processor domain, has
underscored the prevalence of design choices that eventually lead to unforeseen and dire
security vulnerabilities [99, 100]. These vulnerabilities are an unforeseen by-product of a
constitutive performance feature of modern processors—out-of-order speculative execution,
and do not rely on any other software vulnerabilities. Although both vulnerabilities were
first discovered in the year 2018, a vast majority of the processors being used in personal
computers, mobile devices, and in the cloud infrastructure from the year 2010 are believed
to be affected.
Likewise, in the software domain, even though the security industry has been laser-
focused on stamping out bugs and loopholes, major security breaches have been a direct
result of software design flaws [95]. Vulnerability and security loopholes in the power
management sub-systems are not unheard of. For example, the HP power manager (HPPM)
[101] that can monitor, manage and control power environments was previously reported
to contain security vulnerabilities that could potentially allow remote attackers to gain ac-
cess and attack the system [102, 103]. Similarly, a vulnerability was discovered in Intel’s
power management controller firmware (PMC) that could allow privilege escalation and
information disclosure [104].
In alignment to these threats, this research envisages emergence of security flaws
in dynamic voltage frequency scaling (DVFS), workload management and consolidation
techniques, and power state transitioning, as the feature set and algorithm complexity for
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Threat model of a hardware PMU trojan (Figure 1.3)
Trojan Insertion
Malicious circuit embedded
during the hardware design
phase as a part of the RTL





Long sequence of power
state requests to the PMU
are sent by a colluding
software.
Trojan Operation
MPSoC system behavior de-
graded with targeted voltage
and power state manipula-
tion attacks on the on-chip
components.
Table 3.1: Life cycle of a typical hardware-centric malicious PMU Trojan.
decision making grows vehemently [105]. Many DVFS mechanisms extend across memory
controllers, memory devices, network devices, embedded clusters, among other physical
resources [106]. Complex statistical and learning techniques are being quickly adopted for
workload management based on energy consumption and prediction [105, 107]. Design
flaws in these sub-systems can expose the critical internal power management framework
to power attacks, far more potent than any external attacks.
3.3 Summary of Threat Model
Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 together classify the source of threats relevant to our re-
search. Deriving the research problem statement in the backdrop of untrustworthy third-
party components in the ICT power management supply chain, this research formulates
two cross-layer projects to develop a transformative approach to promote trustworthy
computing.
Table 3.1, along with Figure 1.3 summarizes the threat model assumed in the first
project discussed in Chapter 4. The project implements and investigates the impact of a
malicious trojan circuit embedded in the hardware PMU of an MPSoC during it design and
verification phase. The embedded trojan employs a rare-event trigger based on a specific
sequence of voltage requests. Once active, the hardware trojan targets critical operations of
the on-chip components, by covertly manipulating the voltage assignments and tampering
with the power states. Chapter 4 elaborates on the project specifics.
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Threat model of a compromised hypervisor (Figure 1.3)
Trojan Insertion
Malicious code inserted dur-
ing a software update by ex-




the legacy code and an in-
coming patch, such that their





coordinated attacks on the
data-center hardware, and
software.
Table 3.2: Life-cycle of a typical software-centric malicious PMU trojan.
Table 3.2, along with Figure 1.3 summarizes the threat model assumed for the second
project detailed in Chapter 5. In the context of a data-center, the project uncovers and
evaluates the impact of a software-centric attack, where the power management module
of the virtualization suite is assumed to be compromised. A bug in the legacy code is used
to trigger the embedded trojan to inflict an internal power attack by manipulating resource
allocation and utilization. Chapter 5 delves into the project technicalities.
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CHAPTER 4
HARDWARE TROJAN IN PMU
Growing demand for high performance, portable and battery operated devices in au-
tomobiles, consumer electronics, industrial and military has resulted in extensive prolifer-
ation of specialized hardware components for chip level power management. In fact, the
global hardware PMU market accounted for more than 50% of the total analog integrated
circuit (IC) revenue in 2012 [5]. Figure 4.1 dissects this growing prominence of PMUs in
the analog semiconductor market. Further, owing to the trends discussed in Section 2.1,
PMUs are projected to expand at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.6% and
reach US $56 billion by the year 2026 [108]. In this rapidly evolving sector, threat evaluation
and security assurance in PMU—a novel contribution of this work—is the need of the hour.
This chapter, based on the work published in design automation conference (DAC) in
2016, presents an end-to-end investigation of security assurance of third-party hardware
PMU employed in a MPSoC [23]. Specifically, the chapter answers two critical questions:
(i) How are existing trojan detection techniques limited in detecting emerging threats from a mali-
cious third-party PMU?
(ii) How can we assure security and trustworthiness of third-party PMUs?
Fig. 4.1: Market share of analog semiconductors ICs in 2012.
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Section 4.1 encapsulates shortcomings of existing hardware trojan detection techniques.
Section 4.2 details the background of the vulnerable ecosystem. Section 4.3 presents the
conceived threat model to embed a hardware trojan in the third-party PMU. Section 4.4 and
Section 4.5, elaborate on the design, implementation and operation of two potent attacks
evaluated in this project—P-Virus and Drowsy. Section 4.6 describes the novel non-invasive
security assurance technique developed to detect malicious behavior of third-party PMU.
4.1 Limitations of Existing Solutions for PMU Security Assurance
Contemporary research on hardware trojan detection techniques predominantly rely
on supplementary verification, replicated execution, testing against a golden model and
component redundancy, as seen in Chapter 2 [71,109–111]. These techniques, however, are
impractical in the detection of a malicious PMU broadly due to: (i) the singular instance
of a PMU in the MPSoC, (ii) the nature (analog) of PMU response, and (iii) the criticality
(response delay constraints) of PMU signals under attack.
The inadequacy of existing solutions for hardware trojan detection in the PMU is dis-
cussed next.
• Limitation of post-silicon tests: Many previous works examine test pattern generation
based on excitation of rare logic conditions [61, 112–118], although none specifically
target PMUs. Results in Section 4.3.2 demonstrate that innovative trojan activation
techniques in PMUs can easily evade realistic post-silicon tests. The magnitude of
trojan activation complexity, time required for an exhaustive state-space exploration
and the skyrocketing cost for re-verification of procured third-party components
limit the effectiveness of such post-silicon tests.
• Lack of design transparency: Side channel analysis and comparison of side channel sig-
natures against a golden reference chip have been widely explored for trojan detec-
tion [63,119–125]. However, third-party vendors are reluctant to reveal their internal
RTL design to foster a competitive edge. The lack of a trusted golden model disrupts
the effectiveness of side channel techniques. Further, side channel signatures are
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susceptible to process and environment variables making them inefficient for trojan
detection [126].
• Limited trust boundary: Another commonly used design strategy is employment of
third-party sensors in a MPSoC circuit to monitor its on-chip environment [127–131].
For example, contemporary voltage droop detectors can, in theory, be modified to
detect voltage manipulation attacks from a compromised PMU [132, 133]. However,
relying on another third-party vendor design to protect against a third-party PMU
trojan is counter-intuitive, as third-party components are assumed to be outside the
trusted boundary.
Re-purposing existing solutions from an untrustworthy third-party is futile in the con-
text of considered threat model.
4.2 Threat Environment
Figure 4.2 illustrates a simplified MPSoC consisting of a processor core and other IP
blocks representing on-chip memory, communication and accelerators. On-chip IP blocks
often have independent voltage domains and are capable of operating at various dynami-
cally changing voltage-frequency levels. Processor cores have dedicated pins to request
the PMU to supply a specific voltage level at runtime, as determined by the dynamic
Fig. 4.2: Hardware power management environment of a typical MPSoC.
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voltage-frequency scaling (DVFS) control algorithms. Intel’s SpeedStep and AMD’s Pow-
erNow are two such commercial implementations of DVFS technology. Intel microproces-
sors have serial voltage identification (SVID) interface to communicate with on-chip and
off-chip power management units. Processors send digital voltage identification (VID) sig-
nals to the PMU through the SVID interface. PMU decodes a VID signal and supplies the
corresponding voltage to the requesting processor through its power rails. For example,
in Intel’s i7-4650 processor line, the 8-bit (00h − FFh) VID signal can request for voltages
ranging between 0 to 3.04V, and the specified operating voltage range of the processor is
between 1.64V to 1.85V [134].
Further architectural dissection of on-chip components in Figure 4.2 reveal an emerg-
ing trend in the control granularity of dynamic power management (DPM) events. Com-
pared to conventional independent power domains, emerging architectures have control
grains that are an order of magnitude smaller [6]. In densely integrated modern MPSoCs,
the number of independently controllable blocks rise to hundreds, thereby increasing the
complexity and latency involved for run-time monitoring of individual blocks. DPM tech-
niques involve selectively turning off unused components, based on speculated idle time
and history of execution patterns. In conventional architectures, the operating system (OS)
is responsible for idle state management of blocks. To achieve a fine grain control in emerg-
ing architectures, a layer of hardware control in the form of power management IP (shown
as PMU in Figure 4.2) is introduced, in addition to the OS control.
Niche and complex hardware PMU designed for dynamic control of independent
voltage domains, along with optimal management of thousands of fine grain power events
in a MPSoC serves as the vulnerable environment in this work.
4.3 Threat Model
In line with the life-cycle of a trojan discussed in Section 3.1.1, this Section elaborates
on the particulars of threat in modern MPSoCs.
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4.3.1 Trojan Insertion (Threat Origin)
A few key engineers on the third-party PMU team insert a malicious circuit during
the design or test phase [92]. The trojan is designed to remain dormant to elude detection
during verification, and to have a low design and operational foot print.
4.3.2 Trojan Activation (Threat Concealment)
The activation phase is particularly important to a trojan design. Careful choice of a
rare event trigger can conceal the trojan during pre-deployment testing of the chip. This
work uses a software-hardware coalition based sequential trigger that takes advantage of
voltage change requests made by on-chip components. Analogous to the idea presented
by Waksman et al. (sequence cheat code) [135], an attacker uses a sequence of power event
requests such as specific VID patterns to trigger the underlying trojan. An unsuspecting
software is designed to send a pre-defined sequence of voltage change requests in the form
of VID signals to the malicious PMU. The embedded trojan in the third-party PMU mon-
itors these staggered incoming requests for the complex sequence. In modern processors,
VID signals are typically 6 to 8 bits and a sequence of these requests can potentially have
an enormous state space resulting in astronomic test times.
Table 4.1 reveals the magnitude of complexity involved in guaranteed trojan activation
during testing using the technique employed by Chakraborty et al. [112]. PMUs are tested
by applying test patterns (VID), and observing its resulting voltage levels. However, each
test pattern can be applied after a short delay associated with the voltage stabilization
latency. Taking into account the voltage level stabilization time (between 0.1 to a few mil-
liseconds [136]), Table 4.1 evaluates time required in years for guaranteed trojan activation
caused by a specific sequence of VID signals (sequence length of 4 to 64 signals). Table 4.1
also illustrates area and power overhead of the trojan activation design, along with its trig-
ger probability. Observed data shows extremely low probability of activating a trojan in
the malicious PMU during post-silicon tests due to the enormous state space exploration
time associated with exhaustive tests.
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SL Area Power TP Time (yrs)
4 0.16% 0.07% 2.3 × 10−10 6.8 × 10−2
8 0.38% 0.17% 5.4 × 10−20 2.9 × 108
16 0.87% 0.40% 2.9 × 10−39 5.4 × 1027
32 1.80% 0.99% 8.6 × 10−78 1.8 × 1066
64 3.40% 2.10% 7.4 × 10−155 2.1 × 10143
Table 4.1: Limitation of post-silicon testing
4.3.3 Trojan Operation (Threat execution)
Once activated, a trojan can potentially inflict a plethora of attacks on on-chip com-
ponents, adversely affecting the overall system behavior. This work demonstrates two
specific attack vectors that cause substantial degradation in energy efficiency and perfor-
mance. Inimical attacks are carried out in a covert manner making it difficult to pinpoint
the source of an attack.
P-Virus (Section 4.4): The embedded trojan in the PMU tampers with operating volt-
age requests from a processor core. Consequently, the PMU delivers a higher voltage than
what a processor requests, leading to improper voltage-frequency assignments. A surge in
peak power leads to thermal throttling, causing reduction in operating frequency. P-Virus
primarily affects the energy efficiency with a potential degradation in performance due to
thermal throttling. The attack mimics symptoms of a virus in humans such as increase in
operational temperature and reduction in performance.
Drowsy (Section 4.5): The malicious PMU furtively delays wake-up requests of on-
chip components, and at times, abruptly forces blocks to sleep. The attack mimics effects
of drowsiness, affecting the availability of resources. Latency sensitive applications suffer
from severe performance degradation due to an extraneous delay in resumption from sleep
state, and undesired power state transitions. If a component forces an access to a block
under transition, the MPSoC may encounter functional errors.
4.4 P-Virus
Three variants of P-VIRUS are conceived based on manipulation of voltage requests
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and its resulting behavior. In jest, these three variants are named in relation to effects a
virus has on humans.
• Spasm (Vsupply < Vrequest): Voltage supplied by the compromised PMU is less than the
requested voltage. Processor circuits cannot meet timing constraints for the chosen
frequency due to the higher delay associated with lower supply voltage, leading to
functional errors that manifest as glitches in the system.
• Fever (Vsupply > Vrequest): Supply voltage is higher than the requested voltage. A
higher supply voltage will result in loss of energy efficiency, and increase the chip
temperature, similar to an onset of fever in humans. Subtle manipulation of supply
voltage can also help keep an attack stealthy. To compensate for elevated tempera-
ture, the system may lower its operating frequency, thereby degrading the processor
performance.
• Seizure (Vsupply >> Vrequest): Supply voltage is substantially higher than the requested
voltage. Excess heat dissipation due to a sudden increase in the power consumption
can lead to the breach of a processor’s TDP resulting in catastrophic failure and chip
burnout, mimicking a seizure.
This work models and evaluates the Fever variant of P-Virus to show that even modest
voltage manipulations affect the system characteristics significantly.
4.4.1 P-VIRUS Implementation
Figure 4.3 shows the conceptual block diagram of P-Virus attack. Processor core re-
quests the PMU for a voltage determined by the DVFS algorithm by sending a 8-bit digital
signal through the dedicated SVID interface. Hardware trojan embedded in the PMU ma-
nipulates this request and misguides the voltage regulator to deliver a voltage higher than
the requested value. Other on-chip IP blocks are oblivious of this attack on the processor,
and function within their set margins.
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Fig. 4.3: Conceptual block diagram of a P-VIRUS attack. The PMU corrupts the voltage
request sending a higher operating voltage to the processor.
Fig. 4.4: Implementation of P-VIRUS attack. Blocks in red illustrate the trojan behavior.
Figure 4.4 shows the implementation of P-Virus. The VID decoder block deciphers
an incoming VID signal and the trojan manipulates this VID signal. To keep an attack
stealthy, the degree of attack is constrained by altering only 3 bits (4, 5 & 6) of VID in a
random fashion using a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). This also helps reduce the
trojan footprint, and hence, keep the attack concealed. The infected VID (VIDFEV) request
is forwarded to the control circuit that manages requests from many on-chip components
and instructs the regulator to scale the voltage. The regulator outputs the scaled voltage
to power rails corresponding to the block that requested the voltage change. P-Virus in-
fected supply voltage value (VCCF ) corresponding to the VIDFEV is constrained within the
Max. Core VCC
1. The set constraint, along with randomness of voltage manipulation ob-
scures P-Virus attacks, while ensuring that manipulations are significant enough to cause
considerable degradation in system behavior.
Table 4.2 gives an example of VID manipulation for an incoming request of 1.65V.
1Max. Core VCC is the voltage beyond which permanent damage to the processor core is likely.
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Req. VCC VIDTF VIDFEV VCCF
1.65V 74 7C - AC 1.73V - 2.02V
1.8V 87 8B - BB 1.88V - 2.02V
Table 4.2: VID manipulation example. Req. VCC is the voltage requested by the core by
sending VIDTF (Hex). LFSR generates random values between 001 to 111 and manipulates
the VIDTF to a value in the range of VIDFEV (Hex). VCCF is the range of infected voltage
supplied to the core.
Req. VCC is the voltage requested by the core by sending VIDTF (trojan free hex value). A
3-bit LFSR generates a random number between 001 to 111, to inflict an inconsistent attack
and circumvent the generation of identifiable trojan attack patterns in system behavior.
On adding it to VIDTF, a range of possible VIDFEV (Fever attack inflicted hex value) is
determined. Note that the VCCF is limited to a maximum of 2.02V (Max.Core VCC) though
the VIDFEV corresponds to a voltage range of 1.73V to 2.21V. VCCF (trojan infected supply
voltage) is the range of infected voltage supplied to the core.
4.4.2 P-Virus Evaluation
The impact of P-Virus is evaluated using Sniper6.0 multi-core simulation infrastruc-
ture [137]. An Intel i7-4650U processor is modeled with specifications detailed in Table 4.3
and the trojan behavior is designed in it. To simulate the effect of P-Virus, operating volt-
ages of different processor performance-states (p-states) are manipulated, while running
Splash2 benchmark applications. A widely-used on-demand DVFS algorithm is used for
p-state assignment [138]. Ondemand DVFS algorithm dynamically controls the processor




Cores 1 - 2
CPU Type Out-of-Order Engine (OoO)
Frequencies (1.7, 2.1, 2.4, 2.7, 3.0, 3.3) GHz
Voltages (1.6,1.65, 1.70,1.75, 1.80,1.84) V
Table 4.3: Configuration Parameters used to model P-Virus and Drowsy.
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Fig. 4.5: Effect of P-VIRUS on peak power. Peak power increases as a result of increased
operating voltage. Higher value represents a more potent attack.
frequency when the system is idle. A peak thermal design power (TDP) is set, which rep-
resents the maximum heat that is allowed to be generated by a processor during operation.
Frequency is throttled down when the dynamic power (thermal load) rises beyond the set
TDP, to shun assignments that can lead to chip burn-out or system failure.
The potency of P-VIRUS is evaluated using 3 integral metrics: peak power, energy
efficiency and performance. Figure 4.5 shows the comparison of peak power between P-
Virus free and P-Virus infected executions. The x-axis represents chosen real-world Splash2
workloads, and the y-axis denotes the absolute value of peak power obtained from simu-
lations. On one particular execution, the average peak power increase across chosen work-
loads was 19%, with ocean.cont incurring the highest increase in peak power (23%). Since
the attack is designed with capabilities to inflict random increases in voltage, subsequent
runs had varying impact on workloads. Rise in peak power is limited by the thermal de-
sign power (TDP), beyond which operating frequency of the processor is throttled down
to prevent a thermal failure.
Figure 4.6 shows the impact of P-VIRUS on energy consumed. The y-axis denotes the
increase in energy consumption over the course of workload execution. On an average,
energy increases by 18%, with fft incurring the highest increase in energy consumption
(26%). Degradation in system performance is a resultant of thermal throttling in the pro-
35
Fig. 4.6: Effect of P-VIRUS on energy. Energy increases due to the increased power and
degradation in application performance. Higher value represents a more potent attack.
Fig. 4.7: Effect of P-VIRUS on application performance. Performance degrades due to the
thermal throttling to ensure chip safety. Higher value represents a more potent attack.
cessor. In Figure 4.6, ocean.cont workload appears to be an anomaly incurring a meager 5%
increase in energy, even when the peak power increases by 23%. This can be explained by
analyzing energy increase in conjunction with performance results in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7 reveals that ocean.cont did not incur any performance degradation. For this
benchmark, the processor is able to operate at a higher voltage without breaching the set
TDP, implying that attack manifestation also depends on workload characteristics. Loss
in energy efficiency is purely due to an increase in power consumption. For the other
benchmarks, Figure 4.7 shows the degradation in processor performance due to thermal
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throttling (up to 26%). Overall, the trojan degrades system behavior in all three measured
metrics.
To evaluate the footprint of P-Virus, PMU RTL of the OpenSPARC T2 processor is
modified [139]. Logic discussed in Section 4.4.1 is implemented, and synthesized with
the TSMC 45nm library using Synopsys Design Compiler. P-Virus incurs area and power
overheads of 1.39% and 1.06%, respectively.
4.5 Drowsy
Drowsy attack tampers with sleep and wake up requests of various on-chip compo-
nents. The attack mimics drowsiness, affecting the availability of on-chip resources. Three
incarnations of the DROWSY attack are conceived:
• Delayed Sleep: Compromised PMU delays sleep signals, allowing components to be
active even when unused, thereby degrading energy efficiency of the system.
• Delayed Wake up: Delay in wake up can result in resource unavailability. Latency
sensitive applications will suffer from performance degradation.
• Abrupt Sleep: Abrupt transition of blocks to sleep states results in loss of data and
performance degradation.
This work models and demonstrates the delayed wake up scenario of Drowsy attack.
4.5.1 Drowsy Implementation
Figure 4.2 shows an evolving trend in the power management granularity, to enable
precise control of independent functional logic, much smaller than conventional clock and
power domains. When on-chip resources are idle, they are put to sleep to save power.
Breaking down on-chip components into smaller sections for independent control allows
for greater reduction in power.
Figure 4.8 shows the operation of Drowsy attack. Control circuit executes decisions of
the PMU and puts the corresponding block to sleep state. When the resource is scheduled
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Fig. 4.8: Implementation details of Drowsy attack. DROWSY attack is random and focused,
where the blocks under attack vary at different epochs to keep the attack stealthy.
for operation, trojan in the PMU delays the response to this request, adversely affecting
application performance. During an epoch, one or many blocks may send wake-up re-
quests to the control circuit in the PMU. A block select module randomly chooses a subset
of blocks to inflict a sluggish response. Response to these blocks are delayed by a random,
but bounded time, using the delay block fed by a LFSR. Randomness in attack, constraint
in delay threshold, and incoherent focus on a subset of blocks, obscures Drowsy attack.
In summary, Drowsy is a random but focused attack, where blocks under attack vary at
different epochs, thereby keeping the attack stealthy.
4.5.2 Drowsy Evaluation
Drowsy attack is modeled by re-purposing the cost associated with sleep periods and
manipulating the latency whenever a block resumes from a sleep state in Sniper6.0 multi-
core simulator using Splash2 workloads.
Figure 4.9 shows the performance degradation due to Drowsy. Sluggish responses to
wake-up requests increase the number of idle cycles, resulting in a maximum performance
degradation of 59% (average across benchmarks is 34%). Blocks in sleep or those under
transition cannot be accessed, thereby preventing any functional errors.Energy overhead
is negligible, as these blocks consume minimal power during sleep.

































































Fig. 4.9: Performance degradation due to Drowsy.
4.6 Malicious PMU Detection
Security assurance in these complex PMUs is the need of the hour due to their impact
on the entire chip behavior. However, design of techniques to guarantee trust and security
are plagued by following challenges:
• Overcome 3PIP design constraints: Lack of design transparency and the inability to
verify 3PIP design internals introduce security bottlenecks.
• Understand attack semantics: Morphological differences in manifestation and potency
of a trojan varies significantly with each type of attack.
• Component agnostic solution: Diversity in design characteristics among various on-
chip components presents a challenge in creating a generic solution.
• Manage overheads: Constraint on chip size and power consumption requires the min-
imization of circuit-architectural overheads.
To surmount these design challenges, this work proposes a novel Intellectual Property
Risk Assessment Module (IPRAM), designed by the MPSoC integrator and placed at inter-
face of critical 3PIP blocks.
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Fig. 4.10: Conceptual overview of the IPRAM. The IPRAM is designed in-house by the
MPSoC integrator and placed at the interface of a 3PIP block to be monitored.
4.6.1 IPRAM
Figure 4.10 shows the block diagram of the proposed IPRAM. IPRAM assumes no
support from a third-party vendor and effectively detects malicious activities in PMUs,
across various vendors. All outgoing power management requests from third-party IPs are
in parallel sent to the IPRAM, and corresponding responses from the PMU are forwarded
to the IPRAM too. Since IPRAM is placed in parallel to the communication between a
third-party IP and the PMU, it does not add to the latency of power management state
changes. At its foundation, IPRAM sits at the interface (boundary) between trusted and
untrusted zone, and matches all requests to responses to identify the presence of malicious
activity.
In this project, IPRAM consists of two low complexity innovative blocks specifically
designed to identify all malicious power management behavior.: (a) P-Virus monitor (Sec-
tion 4.6.2) and (b) Wake up alarm (Section 4.6.3).
4.6.2 P-Virus Monitor
P-Virus Monitor (PM) is designed based on the insight that supply voltage (Vcc) of a
digital circuit profoundly influences its delay. By characterizing the delay of a known circuit,
supply voltage imposed on that block can be estimated.
Figure 4.10 presents the interface of PM, modeled as a delay estimation block (DEB)
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Fig. 4.11: Design for the detection of P-Virus.
fed by the same supply line as that of the requesting IP block. Figure 4.11 shows a detailed
operation of DEB. The control unit power gates the DEB when not in use, to curtail the
power consumption overhead. A series of cascaded delay buffers (DB) in the form of
a tunable replica circuit are used to estimate the parasitic delay of the circuit [140]. These
cascaded buffers are sampled at equal epochs to capture state transitions at different stages
and thereby estimate the delay for an imposed Vcc. The estimated delay is correlated to
values stored in the look up table to obtain VID corresponding to the delay. The look
up table is filled, during post-silicon characterization tests. The identified VID is then
matched to the VID request in comparator unit, by ignoring 2 least significant bits to grant
a margin for error. If values do not match, the DEB flags as anomalous behavior.
4.6.3 Wake Up Alarm
Wake Up Alarm (WA) is a finite state machine (FSM) to observe arrival of requests and
responses of power state transitions. Delayed and unprompted state changes triggered by
the malicious PMU can be detected.
WA is modeled as a response audit block (RAB) in Figure 4.10, where a request sent
to the PMU is also sent in parallel to the RAB. Figure 4.12 shows a detailed block diagram
of RAB. MPSoC blocks usually have multiple sleep states, varying in state transition times
and power saving capabilities. The control circuit in the RAB feeds a multiplexer to select
the appropriate delay associated with each sleep-to-wake transition. This delay is imposed
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Fig. 4.12: Design for the detection of DROWSY.
on the request and forwarded to the capture circuit, that consists of a FSM with 3 states,
default (D), wait (W) and anomaly detected (T). The FSM is in D state until it detects a signal
from the 3PIP block under test. State transitions in RAB are discussed below.
• D → W : On receiving a wake-up request from a third-party IP block, the state changes
from D to W.
• W → D: If the PMU response is observed within the vendor specified response time,
it triggers a transition from W to D. Third party IP continues its operation.
• W → T: If the PMU response is delayed, the delay block triggers a transition from W
to T, flagging the anomalous behavior— a delayed wake up attack.
• T → D: Once an attack is flagged, all states of monitor blocks are reset, and the
request-response combination for the block under test is quarantined for analysis.
The FSM state transitions to the default (D) to wait for the next arriving request.
• D → T: An unsolicited shutdown/wake-up signal from the PMU, is captured and
flagged— an abrupt attack.
4.6.4 IPRAM Analysis Methodology
This section summarizes the methodology used to evaluate the efficacy and overhead
of IPRAM.
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PM: To evaluate the efficacy of PM, cascaded buffers present in the DEB are modeled
using HSPICE and delay characteristics are obtained for different VCC values. To account
for process variation, a Monte Carlo analysis is conducted by creating a Gaussian dis-
tribution of three parameters: threshold voltage, effective channel length and transistor
width [141].
WA: WA identifies Drowsy attack via a FSM, based on incoming signals. WA is evalu-
ated by implementing the proposed RAB design as a Verilog RTL model using Xilinx ISIM.
Exhaustive tests are performed to observe its behavior for different scenarios.
To find the design overheads of the proposed security assurance solutions, blocks
within the IPRAM are implemented in Verilog RTL and synthesized with the TSMC 45nm
library using Synopsys Design Compiler to find their design overheads.
4.6.5 IPRAM Evaluation
PM: Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 together illustrates two representative cases of PM.
In Figure 4.13a, the worst case scenario for trojan detection is demonstrated, where the dif-
ference between VCCF (1.73V) and VCC (1.65V) is a mere 0.08V. VCCF is the P-Virus inflicted
voltage. This is the lowest increment in voltage that the P-Virus can impose (Section 4.4.1).
The overlap in distribution implies that these delay values can occur both in the presence
and absence of a P-Virus attack, leading to an inaccuracy in trojan detection (false detec-
(a) Worst case (b) FP and FN analysis
Fig. 4.13: Results from PM. Worst case representative of the delay characteristics for P-
VIRUS detection.
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tion). Figure 4.14a represents a typical case, where P-Virus increases the voltage by 0.1V.
For attacks with a voltage increment greater than 0.1V, distribution curves are distinct (no
overlap), implying that there exists an optimum delay threshold with zero false detection.
Threshold Selection: Delay threshold indicates the minimum bound on the delay that can
occur for a chosen voltage. If a voltage higher than the requested value is supplied, the
obtained delay value will ideally be below the threshold. Smart threshold selection helps
reduce the number of false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN). Figure 4.13b, shows the
FP and FN analysis of the worst case. With an optimum threshold of 1.22ns, FP rate is a
(a) Typical case (b) FP and FN analysis
Fig. 4.14: Results from PM. Typical case of the delay characteristics for P-VIRUS detection.
(a) Correct PMU response
(b) DROWSY attack due to delayed response
(c) DROWSY attack by an unsolicited signal
Fig. 4.15: Important scenarios of WA. Figure 4.15a illustrates the correct behavior. Figure
4.15b shows a delayed response attack detection. Figure 4.15c detects unsolicited response.
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mere 1% and FN rate is 4%, giving a false detection rate (FDR) of 5%. As delay moves away
from the optimum threshold, the FDR increases rapidly. For a typical case, the tolerance
for error in optimum threshold selection increases (Figure 4.14b) as the FDR remains less
than 3% for a range of delay thresholds (1.14ns to 1.16ns). Meticulous profiling during the
testing stage helps set accurate thresholds to reduce the FDR.
WA: Figure 4.15 shows three important cases of Drowsy detection. States 00, 01 and 11
indicate states D, W and T, respectively. Figure 4.15b illustrates an attack scenario. A 3PIP
core sends a wake-up request, but the response is delayed by the malicious PMU. WA flags
the trojan, once the vendor specified time expires without a PMU response.
4.6.6 Implementation Overhead
PM and WA incurs area overheads of 0.97% and 0.14%, respectively. Power overheads




Modern data-centers employ complex and specialized power management strategies
in pursuit of energy and thermal efficiency. Computing power management software
suites have swelled to a net size of $314 million, with a growth of 35.48% during 2012-
2016 [3]. These software suites promise to deliver $18.6 billion/year in cost reduction as a
direct consequence of improved energy efficiency [4]. Interestingly, innovation in power
and energy management strategy is intertwined with increasing complexity, and conse-
quently, exposes a new attack surface in an already vulnerable cloud ecosystem. Deliber-
ate attacks on complex power management can leave data-centers crippled, often resulting
in severe loss of productivity, economy and reputation. With more than 58% of the enter-
prises spending at least 10% of their annual budget on cloud services, the need for power
management security assurance is imminent [142].
This chapter, based on the work published in the journal of hardware and systems
security in 2019, presents a novel secure framework created to combat the dangers posed
by a compromised power management module in a data-center. The proposed secure
framework leverages a learning algorithm, along with the long-standing concepts of sys-
tem isolation and resource redundancy to safeguard against harmful power attacks in the
cloud ecosystem. Specifically, this work investigates two critical questions.
(i) What are the repercussions of a security loophole exposed by a compromised power management
module in the data-center?
(ii) How can data-centers be safeguarded from malicious power attacks?
Section 5.1 briefly introduces the design of a typical data-center, and Section 5.2 em-
phasizes on the source and life-cycle of a vulnerability in the system. Section 5.3 delves
into attack specifics, exploiting the exposed security vulnerability, and presents an evalua-
tion of the attack. Section 5.4 explains the novel secure framework proposed in this work,
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Fig. 5.1: Data-center illustration of the threat model.
to safeguard data-center from power attacks, and presents a structured assessment of the
framework’s efficacy.
5.1 Threat Environment
Figure 5.1 presents a simplified illustration of a typical data-center architecture. Data-
centers consist of a distributed and multi-layered software stack including a hypervisor,
multiple virtual machines (VM) and guest OSes, device driver modules, and other service
infrastructure. At the heart of data-center operation is the hypervisor, also known as, vir-
tual machine monitor (VMM). It manages the underlying compute, network and storage
hardware resources and allocates required resources to subscribing applications. This pro-
cess of seamless and efficient sharing of hardware among multiple applications/operating
systems is key to energy proportional computing. Consequently, the hypervisor handles a
lions share of power and energy management responsibilities, as it has direct access to ar-
riving applications, as well as, the underlying hardware. By inspecting internal data struc-
tures, hypervisor obtains coarse-grained per-VM information on how energy is spent on
the hardware, and efficiently manages resources by throttling frequency, migrating VMs
and consolidating applications based on desired system performance.
Power consumption in a data-center can be attributed to various system components
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Fig. 5.2: Power consumption breakdown of a typical high performance data-center system.
such as, processors, storage disks, network elements, memory and a cooling system. Fig-
ure 5.2 illustrates a typical breakdown of power consumption among various system com-
ponents. Section 2.2 revealed the existence of abundant research in both, power man-
agement schemes for individual components, as well as, synergistic cross-layer strategies.
This work explores the implications of security vulnerabilities in this complex eco-system.
5.2 Threat Relevance
Inferring from the generic life-cycle of a trojan (Section 3.1.1), this section formulates
the minutiae that lead to the exposure of security vulnerability.
5.2.1 Origin of an Attack
In line with the discussion in Chapter 3, two orthogonal avenues lead to security vul-
nerabilities in the power management module of the hypervisor:
(a) Security oblivious design artifacts, and
(b) Insider attacks.
In this premise, the power management software stack complexity, compounded with
multiple specialized hardware-software interfaces, and lack of proper verification method-
ologies, will together create a security eventuality. While the security industry has been
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laser-focused on stamping out bugs and loopholes, major software security breaches have
been a direct result of software design flaws [95].
A malicious employee inserts bugs or backdoors in the legacy code of a third-party
hypervisor that an attacker later capitalizes on. Here, the attack surface is initially either
undiscovered or non-existent. At a later stage, the backdoor is exploited to inject a trojan
as a part of legitimate software patch/update, and interact with the legacy bug. Several
design and implementation flaws plague the patch management process [96]. Exploiting
these flaws, malicious code is inserted into power management module of the hypervisor.
The patch payload contains a trojan along with the legitimate code addressing a real issue.
On the contrary, since all updates are now processed online, the source request for
patch updates can be redirected to a mirror web address (hijack/spoof attack) by the data-
center administrators too. Internal attacks are one of the biggest concerns in the IT industry
[143].
5.2.2 Threat Activation
Once a patch is successfully applied, several health checking tasks, as well as, regres-
sion tests are performed to ensure that an update does not adversely affect the existing
system. To elude detection, a bug in the legacy code is exploited to create a rare event to
trigger the trojan after the testing phase.
5.2.3 Operation
Figure 5.1 shows that a compromised power management module in the hypervisor
can, in theory inflict a threefold attack on the data-center architecture.
• First, it can adversely affect the demand response to application requests by manip-
ulating the virtual machine (VM) management algorithms (attack on the software).
• Second, it can impact the application performance by manipulating the power states
of the underlying compute, network and storage hardware (attack on the hardware).
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• Third, it can cripple the data-center by mismanaging the cooling resources. (attack on
the infrastructure).
This work implements and evaluates the first two attack vectors. The attack details
are discussed in Section 5.3.
5.3 HyperAttack - Power Attacks by Compromised Hypervisor
Hypervisor forms the core of data-center power management and hence, has direct
access to power management techniques employed at different abstraction levels. In this
work, HyperAttack epitomizes a new class of potent power attacks realized by compro-
mised power management modules in a hypervisor. A malicious trojan inflicts a coordi-
nated attack across both the hardware and software power management modules. The
operational details are discussed below.
Hardware: Hypervisor governs hardware power and sleep states based on the resource
utilization. To inflict an attack in processor cores, a compromised module manipulates
the process of frequency and voltage assignment to increase the power consumption, even
at low utilization. For example, to retain stealth in the attack, the compromised module
increases computation core frequency/voltage in epochs surrounding a virtual machine
(VM) migration and obscures the increase in power consumption. In addition, if the uti-
lization increases due to application demand, the hypervisor restricts access to available
computation power within each core and distributes workloads across multiple physical
nodes. This results in an increased power consumption, with minimal impact on applica-
tion performance.
Software: Hypervisor is responsible for creation and allocation of VMs based on applica-
tion subscription. In power aware VM allocation algorithms, the hypervisor aggressively
tries to consolidate requests on to a minimum number of physical servers so as to power
down all unused resources and reduce the overall power consumption. The compromised
module manipulates the utilization threshold that determines the allocation of new VMs
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Table 5.1: Data-center configuration parameters.
number of physical servers being under utilized. To further increase the potency of an at-
tack, the compromised module infects VM migration algorithms. While choosing the VM
to migrate, the module calculates the migration time required based on the random access
memory (RAM) utilized and the spare network bandwidth. The compromised module
then migrates the VM that utilizes the maximum RAM and requires a long migration time.
Hence, by manipulating the utilization threshold and migration cost function, the trojan
significantly increases the data-center power consumption.
5.3.1 Evaluation Methodology
The proposed attack model is evaluated using the CloudSim simulator [144, 145] as
it provides support for both system and behavioral modeling of individual components
such as physical hosts, VMs, and resource provisioning policies. Further, it also provides
support for modeling and simulation of energy-aware computation, with adaptive heuris-
tics for dynamic consolidation of VMs based on resource utilization analysis [144, 145].
CloudSim simulator also includes power-aware VM allocation and migration schemes to
perform more energy-efficient data center operations [145].
To implement the proposed attacks, VM allocation heuristics that inspects the host
resource utilization are manipulated. In this work, two VM allocation policies, inter quar-
tile range (IQR) and static utilization threshold (THR) are chosen to evaluate the impact of
HyperAttack. Along with two VM allocation policies, minimum migration time (MMT) is
chosen as the VM migration policy. VM allocation is provisioning of a VM on a physical
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host based on the VM’s request for resources such as, predefined processor cores, memory,
storage, network bandwidth etc. IQR policy determines the upper utilization threshold
based on a statistical dispersion, equal to the difference between the third and first quar-
tiles. IQR algorithm is manipulated to covertly reduce the utilization threshold and induce
more VM migrations. The THR technique, however uses a static threshold to detect over
utilization based on host usage. For a more comprehensive evaluation of the attack, four
variants of the attack are simulated. HyperAttack variants differ based on the sanctioned
deviation of utilization threshold from the optimal value. For four attack variants, the tro-
jan is curtailed from manipulating the utilization threshold within 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%
of the optimal value.
This evaluation employs Planetlab workload, that comprises of real life traces of thou-
sand VMs from servers located around the world [146]. Table 5.1 illustrates the simulation
model based on a data-center with HP Proliant ML110 servers.
5.3.2 Potency of HyperAttack
Figure 5.3 shows the average increase in energy consumption as a result of attacks on
the data-center, for two VM allocation policies: IQR and THR. As expected, the results re-








































Fig. 5.3: Potency of attack variations.
The x-axis denotes the limits enforced by an attacker to the deviation of utilization
threshold from the optimal value, and the y-axis denotes the increase in energy
consumption normalized to the optimal energy consumption. Trend shows that as an
attacker increases the sanctioned manipulation of threshold, the attack potency increases.
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from optimal threshold). When an attacker limits the deviation of manipulated threshold
to 30% of the optimal value, energy consumption increases on an average by 22% for IQR,
and 24% for THR VM allocation policy. Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 consider one variant of the
HyperAttack and examines its potency in detail. For these results, a maximum deviation
of 50% from the optimal threshold is enforced along with other components of the attack.
The trojan is designed to inflict a significant increase in power consumption with minimal
impact on application performance measured as the SLA violations suffered. Cloudsim
models SLA in terms of quality of service (QoS) parameters such as availability, reliability
and throughput. Four scenarios are evaluated: NoTrojan signifies the legitimate behavior.
Compute Units and VM-Management imply that only the respective resource is attacked
and a Coordinated attack illustrates the interplay of both the attack vectors.
Figure 5.4a demonstrates that an attack on the compute resource of the data-center
alone, increases the energy consumption on an average by 6%. Attack on compute re-
sources shows a limited influence on the power consumed predominantly due to con-
straints of maintaining an obscure attack profile by preserving the application perfor-
mance. However, an attack on the VM management policy increases the energy consump-
tion by nearly 60%, on an average. Interestingly, a coordinated attack inflicts higher damage
than the sum of its parts and the overall increase in energy consumption is 72%, on an
average. Figure 5.5a shows a similar trend in energy consumption for the THR VM alloca-
tion policy, with the coordinated attack inflicting 47% increase in energy consumption on
an average. On closer examination, an overall increase in the number of VM migrations is
observed, forced by the attack during data-center runtime. VM migrations are a resultant
of two orthogonal components: (a) shutdown of active hosts to prevent resource damage
from aggressive consolidation, and (b) workload dispersion to caused by reduction in al-
lowed utilization . Figure 5.4b and 5.5b present the percentage increase in SLA time per
active host (SLATAH). SLATAH is the percentage of time during which active hosts expe-
rience a CPU utilization of 100%. On an average SLATAH increases by 5.5% for IQR and



















































































































































































































(c) Increase in IQR SLA violations.
Fig. 5.4: Impact of a HyperAttack using inter quartile range VM migration policy.
Four scenarios are evaluated: NoTrojan signifies the legitimate behavior. Compute Units
and VM-Management imply that only the respective resource is attacked and a
Coordinated attack illustrates the interplay of both the attack vectors. Figure 5.4a shows a
substantial increase in the energy consumption. Figure 5.4b shows the substantial
increase in SLA time per active host. Figure 5.5c show attractive stealth characteristics as
the overall SLA violations are low. X-axis represents the planetlab workload trace IDs



















































































































































































































(c) Increase in THR SLA violations
Fig. 5.5: Impact of a HyperAttack using static utilization threshold VM migration policy.
Four scenarios are evaluated: NoTrojan signifies the legitimate behavior. Compute Units
and VM-Management imply that only the respective resource is attacked and a Coordi-
nated attack illustrates the interplay of both the attack vectors. Figure 5.5a shows a sub-
stantial increase in the energy consumption. Figure 5.5b shows the substantial increase in
SLA time per active host. Figure 5.5c show attractive stealth characteristics as the overall












































































Fig. 5.6: Economic impact of a HyperAttack on energy cost.
VM migrations to prevent performance degradation.
Figure 5.4c and 5.5c show that even under an attack, the increase in overall SLA viola-
tions, remain within 0.15%, even while the corresponding impact on energy consumption
is greater than 60%. In several workload traces, attack on the compute units alone does
not reflect in the SLA violations at all. In addition, Figure 5.5c shows a marginal increase
in SLA violations across all variants of the attack. This small percentage of SLA violations
is distributed across different VMs, and multiple users. The noticeable impact on end user
experience is minimal, thereby keeping the attack stealthy.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the economic impact on the data-center. An upsurge in the power
consumed directly transforms to inflated electricity consumption costs, both to keep the
physical servers in operation, as well as, to cool the operational servers. On an average,
the required operational costs increase by more than $30, 000 per month.
5.3.3 HyperAttack Escalation
HyperAttack can be further escalated to catastrophic proportions to cause a power out-
age and impair the data-center services by exploiting the current trends of data-center
power over-subscription. To alleviate the high cost of infrastructure upgrades, and to max-
imize returns from the existing servers, data-centers are adopting power over-subscription
[147]. Since workloads in the data-center rarely peak simultaneously, power over-subscription
supports a larger number of physical servers than the rated capacity. To safeguard from
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Fig. 5.7: Framework of SCALE. Tactical unit, an isolated core executes the SC-SVM to clas-
sify the data from preempt control module (PCM). PCM monitors power management
decisions and responses, along with system parameters. Under an escalation attack, PCM
seizes control of the data-center.
power violations, a variety of power capping techniques are employed at the server, racks
and the system level. However, these techniques will prove ineffective if the hypervisor it-
self is compromised and causes intentional power violations. For instance, over-aggressive
consolidation of VMs onto fewer physical servers can overload the circuits and trip the cir-
cuit breakers and at times even damage the infrastructure.
Power outage—impact of an escalated HyperAttack—can result in service downtime
and monumental revenue losses. A major airline recently lost about $100 million in rev-
enue due to a power outage in its data-center [9]. In 2013, data-center downtime across in-
dustries cost a whopping $7900 per minute with the cost per incident as high as $690, 000.
A recent power outage resulted in cancellation of 2300 flights globally and cost the airline
about $100 million in revenue. Realizing the monumental impact of power management
security in data-centers, this work introduces a novel secure architecture to detect anoma-
lous power consumption behavior and safeguard against HyperAttack escalations.
5.4 HyperAttack Mitigation
Figure 5.7 illustrates the framework of the proposed Single Class Assisted Learning
Environment (SCALE) to detect hypervisor inflicted power attacks and protect against
catastrophic HyperAttack escalations. Section 5.4.1 presents a comprehensive glimpse at
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the functioning of the secure architecture. SCALE’s two co-dependent components, ma-
chine learning framework (Section 5.4.2) and preemptive control module (Section 5.4.3) are dis-
cussed next.
5.4.1 SCALE Overview
SCALE employs a two pronged approach for security assurance:
1. Monitors and learns the acceptable behavior of data-center vitals to identify anoma-
lous behaviors.
2. Preempts control from the hypervisor to prevent HyperAttack escalations.
To fulfill these objectives coherently, SCALE requires two co-dependent modules:
• Machine learning framework (MLF) (Section 5.4.2) incorporates an independent com-
putation core known as tactical unit (TU), optimized to execute the single class sup-
port vector machine (SC-SVM) [148]. SC-SVM identifies whether a test-point (here,
recurring data-center vitals) lies within the trained data (here, accepted data-center
vitals) to detect anomalous behavior and HyperAttack escalations.
• Preemptive Control Module (PCM) (Section 5.4.3) serves as an interface between the
hypervisor and the hardware resources. Primarily, it monitors the hypervisor power
management decisions along with the hardware responses and furnishes the TU with
the required data. Additionally, it is equipped with the functionality essential to pre-
empt hypervisor control and manage the data-center when the TU predicts a Hyper-
Attack escalation.
5.4.2 Machine Learning Framework
An independent high-performance core (tactical unit) optimized to execute machine
learning algorithms is allocated to the data-center during system design. Depending on
the data-center owner’s security requirement, TU can be either placed on an independent
secure network or totally devoid of remote access to protect against cyber-attacks. TU’s
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only point of communication to the data-center is through the PCM. It accesses features
collected by the PCM and feeds it to the learning algorithm for the detection of anomalies
in data-center vitals. TU logs these anomalies for further analysis. However, on detecting
a HyperAttack escalation, it first commands the PCM to seize control from the hypervisor
to prevent a power outage and then notifies the administrator.
One key challenge of SCALE is to accurately classify legitimate and anomalous be-
haviors while using a limited set of data. Traditional multi-class learning algorithms require
two samples of data (here, malicious data-center vitals, as well as, accepted vitals) to aid the process
of classification, while single class algorithms need only one. In the complex data-center envi-
ronment, acquisition of collective training data of all malicious behaviors is impractical,
due to limitations in attack modeling and simulation. Hence, SCALE will use a single class
SVM algorithm to capture and classify data-center vitals. Data classification and anomaly
detection using SVM involves two phases: training and analysis, discussed below.
• Training: In this phase, TU is provided with n data points denoted by {x1...xn}, that
correspond to legitimate data-center vitals. SC-SVM creates a model of the data-set,
maps that data into a feature space and establishes a hyperplane that will divide the
feature space into two disconnected regions. Region below the hyperplane is popu-
lated with a cluster of data-points that represent the legitimate data-center vitals.
• Analysis: In this phase, for any new incoming sample (current data-center vital), the
SC-SVM classification function will determine which side of the hyperplane the sam-
ple lies, to identify an anomalous behavior. In addition, a subset of data-center vitals
like compute utilization and power consumption, for example, will be frequently
monitored. An aggressive increase in these data-center vitals, among the physical nodes
sharing a power distribution network, will be flagged as a HyperAttack escalation.
SC-SVM Feature Extraction
Selection and optimization of relevant features is essential to ensure the accuracy and
computational efficiency of the SC-SVM. To mitigate the threat presented by HyperAttack,
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three evident features are identified and collected from the PCM: (1) compute utilization per
host, (2) power consumed per host and (3) total data-center power. However, with data-centers
having hundreds of physical hosts, considering each individual compute utilization and
power consumed per host will lead to large computational overheads. Hence, to optimize
the feature set, the physical hosts are clustered together and the mean utilization of each
cluster is considered. To compensate for the loss in accuracy, a fourth feature is added: (4)
number of idle hosts in each cluster.
The process of learning the characteristics of legitimate execution and anomaly detec-
tion relies severely on feature extraction. SCALE can be extended to detect a broader set
of attacks by a careful selection of the feature set. For example, to detect a power manage-
ment attack on the data-center network, the following set of features will prove beneficial:
network bandwidth utilization, network power consumption, network power state, VM migration
and workload characteristics.
The influence of each feature will depend significantly on the objective of a given
attack vector. By carefully selecting the feature set (for example: VM migrations, storage
utilization, network bandwidth utilization), SCALE can be extended to detect a broader set of
attacks.
HyperAttack Escalation Prediction
Based on parameters collected from the PCM, the TU can monitor compute utilization
and power consumption of physical hosts sharing a power distribution unit. An aggressive
increase in these data-center vitals, among the physical nodes sharing a power distribution
network, will be flagged as a HyperAttack escalation, and prompt the TU to signal the PCM
to seize control of the data-center.
5.4.3 Preemptive Control Module
The PCM is a featherweight software layer beneath the hypervisor, designed in-house
by the data-center team. It will serve as an interface between the hypervisor and the hard-
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ware resources. Similar to TinyChecker [149], the PCM will be a special-purpose hypervi-
sor that can be designed in-house, capitalizing on the concept of nested virtualization [150].
Primarily, the PCM’s role will be to monitor the hypervisor power management decisions,
along with the hardware responses, and furnish the TU with the required data. Further-
more, it will be able to preempt the hypervisor control when the TU predicts a HyperAttack
escalation.
In the labyrinthine data-center setting, monitoring and controlling the critical interface
between commodity hardware and third-party software renders a vital leverage to validate
the presence of malicious entities. To assure reliability through formal verification, the
PCM must have a small code footprint while fulfilling the following objectives:
• Interface Monitoring: The PCM snoops on data communicated between hypervisor
and the hardware and compiles a set of inputs to the SC-SVM.
• Preempt Data-center Control: When the TU predicts a HyperAttack escalation, PCM pre-
empts all hypervisor decisions and takes over the data-center. PCM evenly spreads
subscribing VMs among all physical hosts to maintain reliable operation until the
hypervisor security is investigated.
To maintain control flow integrity, the PCM has no privileges to send unsolicited sig-
nals to the TU and no runtime modification to the PCM function is allowed.
The addition of PCM between hardware and hypervisor, albeit a featherweight bare
bone module, will add a small performance overhead to the system. The performance
overhead due to PCM will predominantly depend on three factors: (a) architectural over-
head, (b) I/O overhead and (c) control flow overhead. In addition, the penalty inflicted
due to PCM will vary based on the type of workload, as an I/O intensive or memory
intensive workload will have frequent data exchanges across the layers, and the control
flow will add a small overhead for VM entry and exits. The multitude of factors, along
with the dependence on workload characteristics make it difficult to accurately estimate
the performance overhead of PCM.
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5.4.4 Challenges of SC-SVM Adoption
Following challenges attribute to the use of SC-SVM:
• ν parameter: In SC-SVM, parameter ν determines the upper bound on the fraction of
outliers (here, malicious events), and the lower bound for the number of samples that
are support vectors (here, legitimate samples). Broadly, ν parameter plays a decisive
role in trade-off between overfitting and generalization. Hence, ν significantly affects
the accuracy of SC-SVM for anomaly detection but ν’s value cannot be designated in
advance. ν is selected by meticulous testing of the SC-SVM with a data-set having
only the legitimate data-center vitals and ensuring that the false detection is minimal.
The influence of ν on SCALE accuracy is discussed in Section 5.4.6.
• Feature Extraction: Computation complexity and efficacy of SCALE largely depends
on the choice and size of feature set selected. In a complex and large data-center, ac-
curately determining the features that are affected by an attack vector and optimizing
these features is arduous.
Fig. 5.8: Implementation of SCALE using libSVM tool.
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5.4.5 Methodology
Figure 5.8 shows the process of SC-SVM training and analysis along with feature set
collection from Cloudsim [144, 145]. The chosen attributes are monitored as features (dis-
cussed in Section 5.4.4), and data-points are optimized by finding the mean of each cluster
of physical hosts. This processed data is used to generate the training set for the SC-SVM.
Single-Class Support Vector Machine: An open source tool, libSVM [151] is used to build
the learning environment and classify data in sequence of phases shown in Figure 5.8.
libSVM models a SC-SVM based on the work presented in [148]. The sequences of phases
for SC-SVM classification are:
• Scaling Phase: The data collected from Cloudsim is processed, formatted and fed to
the libSVM tool where the data is scaled to a value between -1 to 1.
• Training Phase: SC-SVM cross-validates the scaled data and generates a training model
by identifying the required tuning parameters (C, γ and CVrate).
• Analysis Phase: Test data from Cloudsim is properly formatted and supplied to the
SC-SVM tool for classification.
5.4.6 Analysis of SCALE
This section presents the sensitivity and specificity analysis of SCALE for classifying
power utilization characteristics. The influence of parameter ν on SCALE’s accuracy is an-
alyzed first. The following metrics are used to analyze the efficacy of SCALE in hypervisor
power attack detection: (i) classification accuracy, (ii) false positive (FP) and false negative
(FN) and (iii) precision and recall.
ν Parameter Analysis
Figure 5.9 shows the influence of ν on the SCALE accuracy. The x-axis represents the
value of ν used for classification, and y-axis represents the average classification accuracy
for PlanetLab traces. In this work, SC-SVM employs a radial basis function (RBF) kernel.







































Fig. 5.9: ν parameter’s influence on classification accuracy.
vectors. Figure 5.9 shows that SCALE achieves the best accuracy at an optimal ν of 0.005
and the accuracy drops off by increasing or decreasing ν.
SCALE Efficacy
Figure 5.10 presents a comprehensive analysis of the efficacy of SC-SVM learning al-
gorithm in the proposed novel secure architecture, SCALE, considering a 40% deviation
from optimal selection as the attack variant using three metrics:
• Classification Accuracy : Figure 5.10a shows the detailed classification accuracy of
SCALE for PlanetLab workload traces for the two VM allocation policies. Accuracy
of SCALE is defined as the ratio of correctly classified samples to the total samples.
On an average, SCALE delivers an accuracy of 99% for IQR and 98% for THR with
ν set at 0.005. Traces collected on 20110309 (March 09 2011) suffered in classification
accuracy for IQR policy compared to traces collected on other days. For this trace, it
was observed that 71 samples were incorrectly flagged by SCALE.
• FP and FN: Figure 5.10b illustrates the percentage of false positive detection. Trojan-
free samples incorrectly classified as malicious samples are represented as FP. For
most traces, the FP lies around 1% for IQR, and 2.5% for THR. However, in IQR
policy two traces 20110322 and 20110411, suffer from higher FP rates of 3.8% and


























































































































































































(c) False Negatives (Lower is better)
Fig. 5.10: Efficacy of SCALE for the detection of anomalies in data-center power consump-
tion.
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load on the data-center was low, and aggressive consolidation of VMs was falsely
identified as malicious activity.
FN analysis (Figure 5.10c) showed that only three workload traces incurred FN for
IQR, whereas FN was slightly more prevalent in THR policy. FN describes SCALE’s
inability to detect true security event samples under certain circumstances. Ideally
all malicious activity should be detected and quarantined. However, the minimal
FN rate of SCALE for dynamic IQR VM allocation policy is promising. 20110309
incurred nearly 5% FN, i.e, SCALE failed to identify 5 out of every 100 malicious
samples. Overall, the FN rate was 0.8% for IQR and 1% for THR.
• Precision and Recall: In binary classification such as SC-SVM, precision and recall
present a measure of relevance. Precision also known as positive predictive value is
given by the Equation 5.1. A high precision indicates that only a handful of legitimate
samples are wrongly classified. Figure ?? shows that SCALE has a high precision









Recall (Equation 5.2), on the other hand indicates the sensitivity of SCALE to accu-
rately identify malicious behavior. Analysis revealed that SCALE has a 99.2% sensi-
tivity for IQR.
Figure 5.11 summarizes the accuracy of SCALE in detection of power anomalies across
power attack variants discussed in Section 5.3.1. The 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% in the x-axis
indicate the maximum deviation of utilization threshold from optimal value that can be
inflicted by an attacker. As the degree of attack increases from 10% to 40%, the detection





























Fig. 5.11: Average detection accuracy of SCALE across benchmarks.
For 10% deviation of utilization threshold in Figure 5.11, the average detection accu-
racy falls to 87% for IQR allocation policy. On correlating these results to the attack potency
in Figure 5.3, it can be observed that the average impact of this variant of the attack on the
data-center is minimal. Further analysis reveals that the delta in energy consumption was
spread out across different epochs of the trace runtime, and the number of host shutdowns
and VM migrations resulting from the attack variant was minimal, and accurately identi-
fied as an anomaly.
The correlation of Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.11 uncovers another interesting characteristic
that acts as a proponent to SCALE’s credibility. Although the attack inflicts a bigger impact
for IQR allocation policy, than when THR policy is enforced (in Figure 5.3), the detection
accuracy of SCALE is higher for THR. For example, for the attack variant of 10%, the
increase in energy consumption is 6% for THR, and 12% for IQR (THR < IQR), however
the corresponding SCALE detection accuracy is 95.2% (THR) and 87.2% (IQR) respectively
(i.e., THR > IQR). The contrasting observation arises as THR uses a static threshold for VM
allocation making it easier for the learning algorithm to identify anomalies, whereas IQR
uses a dynamic threshold. However, in attack variants beyond 40%, the results become
fairly consistent.
Figure 5.12 expands on results shown in Figure 5.11 illustrating the classification ac-
curacy for different PlanetLab workloads that have been considered. Figure 5.12 clearly
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demonstrates that dynamic runtime characteristics of workloads play a significant role in


































































































































(b) Classification Accuracy of ThrMmt (Higher is better)
Fig. 5.12: Detection accuracy of SCALE under different attack variants for both IQR and
THR allocation policies. 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% indicate the maximum deviation of uti-




The research pursued in this dissertation navigates through vulnerability identifi-
cation, threat assessment and security assurance using design-for-trust solutions against
compromised third party power management solutions—a first of its kind. This research
proposes innovative designs with low footprint to defend against security vulnerabilities
in modern complex power management subsystems. The techniques designed during this
work tackle security vulnerabilities across different abstraction levels. By a joint explo-
ration of attack vectors, as well as, techniques to seamlessly detect and protect against vul-
nerabilities, this work presents a holistic approach to lay the foundation for trustworthy
and reliable computing in the presence of malicious modifications in power management
sub-system.
Deriving the threat model from semiconductor supply chain plagued with untrust-
worthy third party components, this work exposed security concerns in specialized hard-
ware power management units. This research proved that covert hardware trojans with
negligible footprints can exist in the PMU, operate in stealth and inflict potent attacks on
the system. Uncovering this novel and imminent challenge to secure hardware design, this
research led to the design of novel IP risk assessment module placed at the boundary be-
tween trusted and untrustworthy components, to detect and defend against attacks from
compromised power management hardware. IPRAM has minimal design and operational
footprint, and can easily be developed in-house by MPSoC integrator without assistance
from third party vendors.
In the realm of high performance data-centers, the repercussions of malicious mod-
ifications in power management sub-systems are catastrophic. To safeguard the data-
centers from a broad range of internal power and energy attacks, a secure framework
called SCALE was developed. SCALE employs fundamental concepts of security, i.e., isola-
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tion and redundancy, in combination with a learning framework to detect power consump-
tion anomalies. The secure framework delivers high classification accuracy in detecting
malicious power activities across multiple power management strategies and dynamically
varying real-time workload traces.
This research underscores the influence of power management sub-systems on system
functionality, performance and energy efficiency. It uncovers an imminent threat to the
emerging energy proportional computing paradigm, posed by a new class of exploitable
security vulnerabilities in complex third party power management solutions. As a result,




[1] A. S. Andrae and T. Edler, “On global electricity usage of communication technology:
trends to 2030,” Challenges, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 117–157, 2015.
[2] R. Wilson, “What your soc designer might not tell you about power management,”
http://www.design-reuse.com/articles/30018/power-management.html.
[3] TechNavio, “Global pc and server power management software market,” Tech. Rep.,
June 2013.
[4] P. Reserach, “Pc and server power management software,” Tech. Rep., October 2011.
[5] Gartner Inc., Competitive Landscape: Power Management IC and Power Semiconductor
Vendors. Gartner Research, 2012.
[6] Sonics Inc. Ice-grain power architecture for mainstream soc designs-the semicon-
ductor ip industrys first power management solution, 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://sonicsinc.com/products/ice-grain-power-architecture/
[7] M. Tehranipoor and F. Koushanfar, “A survey of hardware trojan taxonomy and
detection,” IEEE Design and Test for Computers, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 10–25, 2010.
[8] F. Nekoogar, From ASICs to SOCs: a practical approach. Prentice Hall Professional,
2003.
[9] M. Sasso, “Delta pegs loss from computer breakdown at $100 million,”
02 Sep 2016, http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airline-industry/
20160902-delta-pegs-loss-from-computer-breakdown-at-100-million.




[11] S. Rich, “Battery failure, human error still cause most data center outages,” http://
www.govtech.com/data/224102581.html.
[12] Y. Lee and S. Kim, “Samsung blames small battery flaw for prompting
note 7 recall,” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-13/
samsung-blames-small-battery-flaw-for-igniting-note-7-recall.
[13] G. Keizer, “Expert: ipad wi-fi issues may be linked to power manage-
ment,” https://www.computerworld.com/article/2502757/apple-mac/
expert--ipad-wi-fi-issues-may-be-linked-to-power-management.html.
[14] C. Jensen, “Chrysler owners sound off on a power de-
fect,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/automobiles/
chrysler-owners-sound-off-on-defective-power-module.html.
[15] “Toyota australia to recall prius and prius v vehicles due to the power management
control software,” http://www.govtech.com/data/224102581.html.
[16] C. Whitlock, “More air force drones are crashing than
ever as mysterious new problems emerge,” https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/19/
more-u-s-military-drones-are-crashing-than-ever-as-new-problems-emerge/.
[17] R. J. Shridevi, D. M. Ancajas, K. Chakraborty, and S. Roy, “Runtime detection of a
bandwidth denial attack from a rogue network-on-chip,” in ACM/IEEE International
Symposium on Networks-on-Chip (NOCS), 2015, pp. 8:1–8:8.
[18] R. JayashankaraShridevi, D. M. Ancajas, K. Chakraborty, and S. Roy, “Security mea-
sures against a rogue network-on-chip,” Journal of Hardware and Systems Security, pp.
1–15, 2017.
[19] R. J. Shridevi, D. M. Ancajas, K. Chakraborty, and S. Roy, “Tackling voltage emer-
gencies in noc through timing error resilience,” in ACM International Symposium on
Low Power Electronic Devices (ISLPED), 2015, pp. 104–109.
72
[20] P. Basu, R. J. Shridevi, K. Chakraborty, and S. Roy, “Prada: Combating voltage
noise in the noc power supply through flow-control and routing algorithms,” in
IEEE/ACM Design Automation & Test in Europe (DATE), 2016.
[21] ——, “Iconoclast: Tackling voltage noise in the noc power supply through flow-
control and routing algorithms,” IEEE Trans. VLSI Syst., vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 2035–2044,
2017.
[22] C. Rajamanikkam, R. J. Shridevi, S. Roy, and K. Chakraborty, “Boostnoc: Power ef-
ficient network-on-chip architecture for near threshold computing,” in IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD), 2016.
[23] R. J. Shridevi, C. Rajamanikkam, S. Roy, and K. Chakraborty, “Catching the flu:
Emerging threats from a third party power management unit,” in IEEE/ACM Design
Automation Conference (DAC), 2016, pp. 86:1–86:6.
[24] J. Rajesh, C. Rajamanikkam, K. Chakraborty, and S. Roy, “Securing data center
against power attacks,” Journal of Hardware and Systems Security, pp. 1–12, 2019.
[25] D. Hillman, V. Silicon, and J. W. Tensilica, “Implementing power management ip
for dynamic and static power reduction in configurable microprocessors using the
galaxy design platform at 130nm.”
[26] Integrated Power Management IC For IMVP8 Platforms, http://www.intersil.com/
content/dam/Intersil/documents/isl9/isl95852.pdf.
[27] Dual-Channel (3-Phase CPU/2-Phase GPU) SVID, D-CAP+ Step-Down Controller for
IMVP-7 VCORE with Two Integrated Drivers, http://www.ti.com/lit/ds/symlink/
tps59650.pdf.
[28] High Efficiency Power Supply for Intel IMVP-6/IMVP-6+/IMVP-6.5 CPUs, http://cds.
linear.com/docs/en/lt-journal/LTJournal-V21N3-04-df-LTC3816-Jian Li.pdf.
[29] Companion PMIC for Smartphone and Tablet, https://datasheets.maximintegrated.
com/en/ds/MAX77829.pdf.
73
[30] J. Bagherli, “Powering the next generation portable devices through programmable
pmics,” http://www.gsaglobal.org/events/2012/0508/docs/dialogkeynote
webversion.pdf.
[31] High Efficiency Display Power and LED Driver for Smart Phones, http://www.intersil.
com/content/dam/Intersil/documents/isl9/isl98611.pdf.
[32] ICE-G1 Energy Processing Unit, http://sonicsinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
10/ICE-G1 Product-Brief 160929.pdf.
[33] E. Esteve, “New power management ip solution can dramatically increase
soc energy efficiency,” https://www.dolphin-integration.com/index.php/pdf/
newsroom/in the press/201809 ipnest-Power-IP-for-SoC.
[34] A. Bourdon, A. Noureddine, R. Rouvoy, and L. Seinturier, “Powerapi: A software
library to monitor the energy consumed at the process-level,” ERCIM News, vol.
2013, no. 92, 2013. [Online]. Available: http://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en92/special/
powerapi-a-software-library-to-monitor-the-energy-consumed-at-the-process-level
[35] J. Eastep, S. Sylvester, C. Cantalupo, B. Geltz, F. Ardanaz, A. Al-Rawi, K. Livingston,
F. Keceli, M. Maiterth, and S. Jana, “Global extensible open power manager: A ve-
hicle for HPC community collaboration on co-designed energy management solu-
tions,” in High Performance Computing - 32nd International Conference, ISC High Perfor-
mance 2017, Frankfurt, Germany, June 18-22, 2017, Proceedings, 2017, pp. 394–412.
[36] I. Hewlett-Packard, “Microsoft, phoenix, and toshiba. advanced configuration and
power interface specification,” 2004.
[37] J. Stoess, C. Lang, and F. Bellosa, “Energy management for hypervisor-based virtual
machines.” in USENIX annual technical conference, 2007, pp. 1–14.
[38] Y. Liu and H. Zhu, “A survey of the research on power management techniques
for high-performance systems,” Software: Practice and Experience, vol. 40, no. 11, pp.
943–964, 2010.
74
[39] C. Isci, S. McIntosh, J. Kephart, R. Das, J. Hanson, S. Piper, R. Wolford, T. Brey,
R. Kantner, A. Ng et al., “Agile, efficient virtualization power management with low-
latency server power states,” in ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, vol. 41,
no. 3. ACM, 2013, pp. 96–107.
[40] M. Kandemir, N. Vijaykrishnan, and M. J. Irwin, “Compiler optimizations for low
power systems,” in Power aware computing. Springer, 2002, pp. 191–210.
[41] R. Kravets and P. Krishnan, “Application-driven power management for mobile
communication,” Wireless Networks, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 263–277, 2000.
[42] A. Lungu, P. Bose, D. J. Sorin, S. German, and G. Janssen, “Multicore power man-
agement: Ensuring robustness via early-stage formal verification,” in Proceedings of
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Formal Methods and Models for Co-Design (MEM-
OCODE), 2009, pp. 78–87.
[43] F. Bembaron, S. Kakkar, R. Mukherjee, and A. Srivastava, “Low power verification
methodology using upf,” Proceedings of DVCon, pp. 228–233, 2009.
[44] D. Kouroussis and F. N. Najm, “A static pattern-independent technique for power
grid voltage integrity verification,” in IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference
(DAC), 2003, pp. 99–104.
[45] M. Nizam, F. N. Najm, and A. Devgan, “Power grid voltage integrity verification,”
in ACM International Symposium on Low Power Electronic Devices (ISLPED), 2005, pp.
239–244.
[46] F. J. Mesa-Martinez, J. Nayfach-Battilana, and J. Renau, “Power model validation
through thermal measurements,” in International Symposium on Computer Architecture
(ISCA), 2007, pp. 302–311.
[47] F. J. Mesa-Martinez, E. K. Ardestani, and J. Renau, “Characterizing processor thermal
behavior,” in Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems
(ASPLOS), 2010, pp. 193–204.
75
[48] K. Najeeb, V. V. R. Konda, S. K. S. Hari, V. Kamakoti, and V. M. Vedula, “Power virus
generation using behavioral models of circuits,” in IEEE VLSI Test Symposium (VTS),
2007, pp. 35–42.
[49] M. S. Hsiao, E. M. Rudnick, and J. H. Patel, “Peak power estimation of VLSI circuits:
new peak power measures,” IEEE Transactions on VLSI Systems (TVLSI), vol. 8, no. 4,
pp. 435–439, 2000.
[50] H. Kriplani, F. N. Najm, and I. N. Hajj, “Pattern independent maximum current es-
timation in power and ground buses of CMOS VLSI circuits: Algorithms, signal
correlations, and their resolution,” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of In-
tegrated Circuits and Systems (TCAD), vol. 14, no. 8, pp. 998–1012, 1995.
[51] T. S. Messerges, E. A. Dabbish, and R. H. Sloan, “Examining smart-card security
under the threat of power analysis attacks,” IEEE transactions on computers, vol. 51,
no. 5, pp. 541–552, 2002.
[52] M. Guri, M. Monitz, Y. Mirski, and Y. Elovici, “Bitwhisper: Covert signaling channel
between air-gapped computers using thermal manipulations,” Journal on Computing
Research Repository, vol. abs/1503.07919, 2015.
[53] J. A. Ambrose, R. G. Ragel, and S. Parameswaran, “A smart random code injection
to mask power analysis based side channel attacks,” in 2007 5th IEEE/ACM/IFIP In-
ternational Conference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis (CODES+
ISSS). IEEE, 2007, pp. 51–56.
[54] M. Hutter and J.-M. Schmidt, “The temperature side channel and heating fault at-
tacks,” in International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications.
Springer, 2013, pp. 219–235.
[55] Z. Wu, M. Xie, and H. Wang, “Energy attack on server systems,” in USENIX Technical
Conference, 2011, pp. 62–70.
76
[56] F. Palmieri, S. Ricciardi, U. Fiore, M. Ficco, and A. Castiglione, “Energy-oriented
denial of service attacks: an emerging menace for large cloud infrastructures,” The
Journal of Supercomputing, vol. 71, no. 5, pp. 1620–1641, 2015.
[57] Z. Xu, H. Wang, Z. Xu, and X. Wang, “Power attack: An increasing threat to data
centers,” in 21st Annual NDSS Symposium, USA, February 23-26, 2014.
[58] X. Gao, Z. Xu, H. Wang, L. Li, and X. Wang, “Why some like it hot too: Thermal
attack on data centers,” in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, vol. 45,
no. 1. ACM, 2017, pp. 23–24.
[59] M.-K. Yoon, S. Mohan, J. Choi, J.-E. Kim, and L. Sha, “Securecore: A multicore-based
intrusion detection architecture for real-time embedded systems,” 2013, pp. 21–32.
[60] L. Fiorin, G. Palermo, S. Lukovic, V. Catalano, and C. Silvano, “Secure memory ac-
cesses on networks-on-chip,” IEEE Transactions on Computers (TC), vol. 57, no. 9, pp.
1216–1229, 2008.
[61] K. Hu, A. N. Nowroz, S. Reda, and F. Koushanfar, “High-sensitivity hardware trojan
detection using multimodal characterization,” in IEEE/ACM Design Automation &
Test in Europe (DATE), 2013, pp. 1271–1276.
[62] R. Paseman and A. Orailoglu, “Towards a cost-effective hardware trojan detection
methodology,” in IEEE VLSI Test Symposium (VTS), 2013, pp. 1–3.
[63] J. Zhang, H. Yu, and Q. Xu, “Htoutlier: Hardware trojan detection with side-channel
signature outlier identification,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2012, pp. 55–58.
[64] A. K. Kanuparthi, R. Karri, G. Ormazabal, and S. Addepalli, “A high-performance,
low-overhead microarchitecture for secure program execution,” in IEEE International
Conference on Computer Design (ICCD), 2012, pp. 102–107.
77
[65] S. Ravi, A. Raghunathan, and S. T. Chakradhar, “Tamper resistance mechanisms for
secure, embedded systems,” in IEEE International Conference on VLSI Design, 2004,
pp. 605–.
[66] T. Kgil, L. Falk, and T. N. Mudge, “Chiplock: support for secure microarchitec-
tures,” Special Interest Group on Computer Architecture (SIGARCH) Computer Archi-
tecture News, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 134–143, 2005.
[67] B. Rogers, M. Prvulovic, and Y. Solihin, “Efficient data protection for distributed
shared memory multiprocessors,” in IEEE Parallel Architectures and Compilation Tech-
niques (PACT), 2006, pp. 84–94.
[68] G. E. Suh, D. E. Clarke, B. Gassend, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas, “Efficient memory
integrity verification and encryption for secure processors,” in IEEE/ACM Interna-
tional Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), 2003, pp. 339–350.
[69] J. A. Roy, F. Koushanfar, and I. L. Markov, “Epic: Ending piracy of integrated cir-
cuits,” in IEEE/ACM Design Automation & Test in Europe (DATE), 2008, pp. 1069–1074.
[70] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas, “Physical unclonable functions for device authentication
and secret key generation,” in IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference (DAC), ser.
DAC ’07, 2007, pp. 9–14.
[71] C. Liu, J. Rajendran, C. Yang, and R. Karri, “Shielding heterogeneous mpsocs from
untrustworthy 3pips through security-driven task scheduling,” in IEEE Symposium
on Defect and Fault-Tolerance in VLSI Systems (DFT), 2013, pp. 101–106.
[72] O. S. Hofmann, S. Kim, A. M. Dunn, M. Z. Lee, and E. Witchel, “Inktag: secure
applications on an untrusted operating system,” ACM SIGPLAN Symposium, vol. 48,
no. 4, pp. 265–278, Mar. 2013.
[73] S. Checkoway and H. Shacham, “Iago attacks: why the system call api is a bad un-
trusted rpc interface,” in Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems (ASPLOS). ACM, 2013, pp. 253–264.
78
[74] F. Zhang, J. Chen, H. Chen, and B. Zang, “Cloudvisor: retrofitting protection of vir-
tual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization,” in SOSP, ser. SOSP
’11. ACM, 2011, pp. 203–216.
[75] X. Chen, T. Garfinkel, E. C. Lewis, P. Subrahmanyam, C. A. Waldspurger, D. Boneh,
J. Dwoskin, and D. R. Ports, “Overshadow: a virtualization-based approach to
retrofitting protection in commodity operating systems,” SIGOPS, vol. 42, no. 2, pp.
2–13, Mar. 2008.
[76] D. R. K. Ports and T. Garfinkel, “Towards application security on untrusted operat-
ing systems,” ser. HOTSEC’08. USENIX Association, 2008, pp. 1:1–1:7.
[77] R. Ta-Min, L. Litty, and D. Lie, “Splitting interfaces: making trust between appli-
cations and operating systems configurable,” ser. OSDI ’06. Berkeley, CA, USA:
USENIX Association, 2006, pp. 279–292.
[78] J. Yang and K. G. Shin, “Using hypervisor to provide data secrecy for user applica-
tions on a per-page basis,” in ACM SIGPLAN Symposium, ser. VEE. ACM, 2008, pp.
71–80.
[79] J. M. McCune, Y. Li, N. Qu, Z. Zhou, A. Datta, V. Gligor, and A. Perrig, “Trustvi-
sor: Efficient tcb reduction and attestation,” in IEEE/ACM International Symposium
on Security and Privacy, ser. SP ’10. IEEE Computer Society, 2010, pp. 143–158.
[80] J. M. McCune, B. J. Parno, A. Perrig, M. K. Reiter, and H. Isozaki, “Flicker: an execu-
tion infrastructure for tcb minimization,” SIGOPS, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 315–328, Apr.
2008.
[81] B. Parno, J. R. Lorch, J. R. Douceur, J. Mickens, and J. M. McCune, “Memoir: Practical
state continuity for protected modules,” in IEEE/ACM International Symposium on
Security and Privacy, ser. SP ’11. IEEE Computer Society, 2011, pp. 379–394.
[82] A. Behnia, R. A. Rashid, and J. A. Chaudhry, “A survey of information security risk
analysis methods,” SmartCR, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 79–94, 2012.
79
[83] B. Liu, L. Shi, Z. Cai, and M. Li, “Software vulnerability discovery techniques: A
survey,” in 2012 Fourth International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking
and Security. IEEE, 2012, pp. 152–156.
[84] A. Apvrille, D. Gordon, S. E. Hallyn, M. Pourzandi, and V. Roy, “Digsig: Runtime
authentication of binaries at kernel level.” in LISA, vol. 4, 2004, pp. 59–66.
[85] X. Zhou, Y. Lee, N. Zhang, M. Naveed, and X. Wang, “The peril of fragmentation:
Security hazards in android device driver customizations,” in 2014 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 2014, pp. 409–423.
[86] G. McGraw, Software security: building security in. Addison-Wesley Professional,
2006, vol. 1.
[87] J. Sahoo, S. Mohapatra, and R. Lath, “Virtualization: A survey on concepts, taxon-
omy and associated security issues,” in 2010 Second International Conference on Com-
puter and Network Technology. IEEE, 2010, pp. 222–226.
[88] Y. Wang, J. Zheng, C. Sun, and S. Mukkamala, “Quantitative security risk assess-
ment of android permissions and applications,” in IFIP Annual Conference on Data
and Applications Security and Privacy. Springer, 2013, pp. 226–241.
[89] M. Tehranipoor and C. Wang, Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust. Springer,
2011.
[90] H. Salmani, M. Tehranipoor, and J. Plusquellic, “A novel technique for improving
hardware trojan detection and reducing trojan activation time,” IEEE Transactions on
VLSI Systems (TVLSI), vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 112–125, 2012.
[91] F. Imeson, S. Nejati, S. Garg, and M. Tripunitara, “Non-deterministic timers for hard-
ware trojan activation (or how a little randomness can go the wrong way),” in 10th
USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies WOOT 16), 2016.
80
[92] A. Waksman, M. Suozzo, and S. Sethumadhavan, “Fanci: identification of stealthy
malicious logic using boolean functional analysis,” in ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS), 2013, pp. 697–708.
[93] “Intelligence threat handbook,” http://fas.org/irp/threat/handbook/.
[94] J. Brill, “The intersection of consumer protection and competition in the new world
of privacy,” Competition Pol’y Int’l, vol. 7, pp. 7–313, 2011.
[95] I. Arce, K. Clark-Fisher, N. Daswani, J. DelGrosso, D. Dhillon, C. Kern, T. Kohno,
C. Landwehr, G. McGraw, B. Schoenfield et al., “Avoiding the top 10 software se-
curity design flaws,” Technical report, IEEE Computer Societys Center for Secure Design
(CSD), 2014.
[96] J. Chan, “Essentials of patch management policy and practice,” Jan 2004, http://
www.patchmanagement.org/pmessentials.asp.
[97] S. T. King, J. Tucek, A. Cozzie, C. Grier, W. Jiang, and Y. Zhou, “Designing and
implementing malicious hardware.” in Proceedings of 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-
Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats, vol. 8, 2008, pp. 1–8.
[98] X. Jiang and Y. Zhou, A Survey of Android Malware. New York, NY: Springer New
York, 2013, pp. 3–20.
[99] M. Lipp, M. Schwarz, D. Gruss, T. Prescher, W. Haas, S. Mangard, P. Kocher,
D. Genkin, Y. Yarom, and M. Hamburg, “Meltdown,” CoRR, vol. abs/1801.01207,
2018.
[100] P. Kocher, D. Genkin, D. Gruss, W. Haas, M. Hamburg, M. Lipp, S. Mangard,
T. Prescher, M. Schwarz, and Y. Yarom, “Spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative exe-
cution,” meltdownattack.com, 2018.
[101] “Hp power manager user guide,” https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/
display?docId=emr na-c01272419.
81
[102] “Hp power manager vulnerability cve-2011-0280,” https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/
detail/CVE-2011-0280.
[103] “Hp power manager vulnerability cve-2010-4113,” https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/
detail/CVE-2010-4113.
[104] “Intel power management controller firmware vulnerability cve-2018-3643,”
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3643.
[105] S. Mittal, “Power management techniques for data centers: A survey,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1404.6681, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.6681
[106] H. David, C. Fallin, E. Gorbatov, U. R. Hanebutte, and O. Mutlu, “Memory power
management via dynamic voltage/frequency scaling,” in ACM Proceedings on Inter-
national Conference on Autonomic Computing, 2011, pp. 31–40.
[107] F. Farahnakian, P. Liljeberg, and J. Plosila, “Energy-efficient virtual machines con-
solidation in cloud data centers using reinforcement learning,” in 22nd Euromicro In-
ternational Conference on Parallel, Distributed, and Network-Based Processing, PDP 2014,
Torino, Italy, February 12-14, 2014, 2014, pp. 500–507.
[108] T. M. Research, “Power management integrated circuit (pmic) market (product -
voltage regulators, motor control ic, integrated assp power management ic, bat-
tery management ic, microprocessor supervisory ic; end use - automotive, consumer
electronics, industry, telecom and networking) - global industry analysis, size, share,
growth, trends, and forecast 2018 - 2026,” 2018.
[109] X. Zhang and M. Tehranipoor, “Case study: Detecting hardware trojans in third-
party digital ip cores,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-
Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2011, pp. 67–70.
[110] M. Farag and M. Ewais, “Smart employment of circuit redundancy to effectively
counter trojans (secret) in third-party ip cores,” in International Conference on ReCon-
Figurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig), Dec 2014, pp. 1–6.
82
[111] B. Salamat, T. Jackson, G. Wagner, C. Wimmer, and M. Franz, “Runtime defense
against code injection attacks using replicated execution,” IEEE Transactions on De-
pendable and Secure Computing, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 588–601, 2011.
[112] R. S. Chakraborty, F. G. Wolff, S. Paul, C. A. Papachristou, and S. Bhunia, “MERO:
A statistical approach for hardware trojan detection,” in International Workshop on
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2009, pp. 396–410.
[113] N. Lesperance, S. Kulkarni, and K.-T. Cheng, “Hardware trojan detection using ex-
haustive testing of k-bit subspaces,” in Proceedings of Asia-Pacific Design Automation
Conference (ASP-DAC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 755–760.
[114] S. Ray, J. Yang, A. Basak, and S. Bhunia, “Correctness and security at odds: Post-
silicon validation of modern soc designs,” in IEEE/ACM Design Automation Confer-
ence (DAC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[115] S. Wei, K. Li, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, “Provably complete hardware trojan
detection using test point insertion,” in IEEE International Conference on Computer-
Aided Design (ICCAD), 2012, pp. 569–576.
[116] J. Li and J. Lach, “At-speed delay characterization for ic authentication and trojan
horse detection,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented
Security and Trust (HOST), 2008, pp. 8–14.
[117] Y. Huang, A. Chattopadhyay, and P. Mishra, “Trace buffer attack: Security versus
observability study in post-silicon debug,” in 2015 IFIP/IEEE International Conference
on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 355–360.
[118] Y. Huang, S. Bhunia, and P. Mishra, “Mers: Statistical test generation for side-
channel analysis based trojan detection,” in The ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), 2016.
[119] M. Banga and M. S. Hsiao, “A novel sustained vector technique for the detection of
hardware trojans,” in IEEE International Conference on VLSI Design, 2009, pp. 327–332.
83
[120] S. Narasimhan, D. Du, R. S. Chakraborty, S. Paul, F. G. Wolff, C. A. Papachris-
tou, K. Roy, and S. Bhunia, “Hardware trojan detection by multiple-parameter side-
channel analysis,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 62, no. 11, pp. 2183–2195, Nov
2013.
[121] S. Narasimhan, X. Wang, D. Du, R. S. Chakraborty, and S. Bhunia, “Tesr: A robust
temporal self-referencing approach for hardware trojan detection,” in Proceedings of
IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2011,
pp. 71–74.
[122] A. N. Nowroz, K. Hu, F. Koushanfar, and S. Reda, “Novel techniques for high-
sensitivity hardware trojan detection using thermal and power maps,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems (TCAD), vol. 33,
no. 12, pp. 1792–1805, 2014.
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